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_AIERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS
VALERIAN E. GREAVES*
THIS article is an attempt to give a comparative outline of the
laws of various Latin-American countries concerning a peculiar
remedy of bankruptcy law called revindication, which corresponds
both to our remedies of reclamation and stoppage in transitu.
With the daily increase of business intercourse between the
United States and Latin-America, it becomes more than a matter
of abstract interest for a domestic lawyer to be acquainted with
the laws and institutions of these countries. For this reason,
irrespective of its possible value as a theoretical study of a rather
interesting question of foreign law, this article may be of some
practical use to the legal profession as a reference in foreign
bankruptcy cases involving the problem of whether or not a do-
mestic client may claim the benefit revindication. Furthermore,
in view of the increasing criticism and approaching revision of
our own bankruptcy laws it may be both interesting and profit-
able to compare the laws of our foreign neighbors determining
the scope of application as well as the contingencies of this very
important but also dangerous and double edged remedy.
Although the main purpose of this article is to give a general
outline of Latin-American laws on the subject, it includes rather
copious reference to French statutes, decisions and text books-
and this for two reasons. First, because French law applies,
directly or by adaptation, in French Guiana, the French West
Indies, the Dominican Republic and Haiti; and, second, because
the principles of French law influence all Latin-American legal
systems to the extent that even in Argentina, Brazil and M'exico
French textbooks predominate and are considered as books of
authority, not only being used in legal research and the teaching
of law, but even being freely cited in court decisions.'
* Member of the bar of Petrograd, 1903-1917, and of Commissions ap-
pointed to draw new civil and commercial cods for Russia; under the
Kerensky Government, member of the Legal Advisory Council; since 1924,
counsel on foreign law with the firm of Marvin & Bergh, New York City.
The writer owes a great debt of gratitude to the Columbia University
Law Library and its personnel for the unusual facilities and helpful co-
operation he found there.
I References in this article to statutes with the word "Civ.' preceding
the number of the section indicate civil codes; references without any
qualification before the number of the section indicate commercial codes.
Thus CHIL. Civ. 2234 means "CHILEA CIVIL CODE, Section 2234" and
CHrL. 1515 means "CHILEAN CODE OF COMMERCE, Section 1515." References
to the decisions of French courts are taken from the RECUEIL PERIODIQUE
DALLOZ, quoted briefly as "DALLoz." Figures after this word signify year,
part and page number. Decisions of the Court de Cassation are printed
in Part I; decisions of the Courts of Appeal are printed in Part IL
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I. REVINDICATION IN GENERAL, ITS SCOPE AND PURPOSE
IN BANKRUPTCY
Revindication, in the strict sense of the word, is a remedy in civil
law whereby an owner can assert his exclusive right of ownership
against anyone who may be in possession of his property without
legal title. This remedy, closely akin to the ejectment and re-
plevin of Anglo-Saxon common law, applies both to real and per-
sonal property. As regards the latter, however, its scope is con-
siderably limited by the well known principle of civil law
(accepted by the great majority of Latin-American codes) that
title acquired in good faith from one having possession is valid
even though the grantor himself had no title.2
Under the name "rei vindicctio" (from vindicta, a small sym-
bolical rod used by the parties in ancient Roman proceedings)
this remedy was already known by the dawn days of Roman legal
history as a universal action (ubi rem memon invenio ibi 'vindico)
of a dispossessed owner against a possessing non-owner to com-
pel the restitution of the property. In the early Roman proceed-
ings (the so-called legis actiones) this action was in substance a
challenge, supported by the wager of a sum of money (sacra-
mentum), to the possessor to prove his title as against that
claimed by the plaintiff. Thus it presupposed the conflict of two
claimants each alleging ownership, the "res" in litigation remain-
ing with the party who could prove his title, and the loser for-
feiting his sacramentum to the state.3 In the later formular type
2 "E fait de meubles possession vaut titre" (in regard to personal prop-
erty, possession is equivalent to title). FRENcH Civ. 2279. Of. BoL. CIV.
1559; ARG. Civ. 2446; CHIL. Civ. 1490; Ecu. Civ. 1480; CoL. Civ. 1547;
EL SALV. Civ. 1361; NIC. Civ. 1768; PAN. Civ. 450; CUB. Civ. 464; Mrx.
Civ. 1352-all containing rules which, though less drastic than the French
code, still afford sufficient protection to the bona fide purchaser. Contra:
BRAziL. Civ. 622; HoND. Civ. 869; VENEZ. Civ. 1777 (if the seller does not
act in good faith).
- A vivid description of oral pleadings before a magistrate in a "legis
aetio per sacramentum" is given by Gaius in the fourth commentary of his
Institutiones, §§ 15 and 16. The parties to the litigation first had to ap-
pear before the magistrate (originally consul, duumvir, later practor).
Then the plaintiff, touching the object of litigation with a small rod (fes-
tuca or vindicta), pronounced the solemn words of complaint: "I declare
that this man (thing, etc.) is mine under the law of the Quirites with all
advantages, and in accordance with my words I have imposed my indiota
against thee." If the defendant did not want to confess the judgment he
had also to put his festuca on the thing in dispute and pronounce exactly
the same words, alleging that he, the defendant, had title (contravindicatio).
(A mere allegation that the plaintiff had no title, not supported by posi-
tive allegation of having title, would be a bad plea and the defendant
would immediately lose his case). Thereupon the magistrate ordered both
parties to release the res in litigation: "Both of you leave the man
(thing) alone." The plaintiff then challenged the defendant to produce
his proof of title in the following words: "Pray, maybe thou willst say
[Vol. 4D
REVINDICATION IN BANKRUPTCY
of proceedings the element of bilateral fight for ownership dis-
appeared and the revindication was broadened by the practor to
become simply a demand by the alleged owner against the un-
lawful possessor to surrender the property. With certain modi-
fications this is the same universal remedy which, under the
names of rivendication (French law), reivndicaci6n (Spanish
law), 'reivendigao (Portuguese law), the modern civil law offers
to the owner against the unlawful holder of his property.
In addition to the use of the term in its strict or proper mean-
ing, however, "revindication" is employed in modern codes to
describe a specific remedy in banlruptcy, the purpose of which
is to exclude certain assets (tangible as well as to a certain
extent intangible) from that part of the bankrupt's estate avail-
able to the creditors for ultimate liquidation, and to have them
surrendered to claimants in preferance to all creditors, general
as well as privileged. This remedy is considerably more ex-
tensive than its name would indicate. It applies not only to
claims of owners for recovery of their property, but also to
many other somewhat similar but not at all identical claims
which could not logically be based on ownership and its exclu-
sive nature.
Broadly speaking revindication in bankruptcy comprises the
following specific claims:
(1) Reclamation by the owner of property held by the bank-
rupt in bailment (revindication proper).
(2) Claims for the recovery of funds held by the banlaupt
in trust for a special purpose (not recognized in some jurisdic-
tions).
(3) Claims of the owner for the unpaid value of his property
which has been sold by the banlupt.
(4) Claims of the unpaid seller, under certain circumstances,
for the recoupment of merchandise sold by him to the bankrupt.
for what reason thou claimest vindication," and the defendant answered:
"I imposed vindIct, in the exercise of my right." Thereupon the plain-
tiff pledged the "sacramcntum," saying: "Since thou claimest vindication
unjustly, I challenge thee in the sum of 500 asses as sacram'ntunm." The
defendant answered: "And I do likewise too?' This having closed the
pleadings before the magistrate, the issue was solemnly joined before wit-
nesses and the case sent for decision to a ji~dex (a layman acting as an
arbitrator). The property in litigation remained in the custody of one of
the parties under bond, the sacranemth being deposited with the praetor.
Gaius thinks that the festzu, or vindicta in these proceedings symbolized
a spear-in its turn a symbol of ownership. The whole proceedings prob-
ably dramatized the abolition of private feuds over civil wrongs and their
replacement by compulsory arbitration ordered by the state in the case
of controversies. A good outline of the early legisactionary proceedings
may be found in KUHLENBECK, ENTWICKELUNGGESCHICIITE DES RdLISHE
RECHTS (1913) 174 et seq.
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(5) The resulting right of the seller to rescind the sale on
the basis of "in integrum restitutionis," if the receiver or trustee
in bankruptcy should not elect to perform the contract by pay-
ing or guaranteeing the payment of the full price.
(6) Claims of the unpaid seller entitled to revindication for
the purchase price of merchandise from a third party to whom
it may have been sold by the bankrupt.
The common principle upon which these six particular forms
of revindication are based may be stated briefly, thus: The
creditors in bankruptcy cannot enrich themselves by retaining
in the bankrupt estate items which, outside of bankruptcy and
in the ordinary course of business, could not be considered as
assets of the merchant available to his creditors for the satis-
faction of their claims, and, therefore, determining the extent
of his credit capacity-be it because he held these assets (or
their equivalent where identifiable) in trust for a third party
or because he had not yet acquired physical possession of them.
From this standpoint, and for the purpose of the better sys-
tematization of the subject matter of this article, the various
types of revindication claims in bankruptcy may be classified
as follows:
(1) Claims of owners for recovery of property held by the
bankrupt in bailment.
(2) Claims for recovery of funds (negotiable paper, securi-
ties *and even moneys~in some countries) held by the bankrupt
in trust for specific purposes.
(3) Claims of the unpaid seller for return of the merchan-
dise with rescission of the sale (our stoppage in transitu).
(4) In case of sale by the bankrupt of reclaimable property,
claims for its unpaid price against the buyer.
There are several other somewhat irregular cases of revindica-
tion which will be discussed in a special section outside of this
general classification.
II. REVINDICATION BY OWNERS OF PROPERTY HELD IN BAILMENT
Theoretically speaking, claims of owners for recovery of their
property held by the bankrupt in bailment without title trans-
fering ownership do not require a special statute for their recog-
nition in bankruptcy. The right to reclaim such property is
an attribute of ownership enforceable against any holder of
the owner's property whether solvent or bankrupt; and if all
laws of bankruptcy contain more or less detailed rules concern-
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ing revindication by the owner, their actual purpose is not so
much to establish or confirm the right of revindication as to
determine its limits and prescribe the formalities upon which
the practical exercise of the right depends.
A. In General
A few codes - contain no general rules concerning the revindi-
cation of property held in bailment, but limit themselves to
mentioning the most important and frequent cases of such re-
vindication-consignment, deposit and revindication by wives.
These statutes, however, have never been interpreted strictly.
On the contrary, they have always been construed to be mere
illustrations of the general principle that the unrestricted right
of revindication belongs as a matter of common law to every
person who can qualify as owner of a thing held by the bankrupt
in bailment. As the French courts have repeatedly stated, re-
gardless of the restrictive wording of Section 575 of the Com-
mercial Code, French jurisprudence has never hesitated to extend
the scope of the rule to give the remedy of revindication of mer-
chandise or of its price to every person on behalf of whom the
bankrupt holds personal property-whether by mandate, loan,
lease or pledge-provided the claimant can prove the identity
of the property.5
The great majority of the Latin-American codes, however,
contain more or less general rules confirming the right of the
owner to reclaim his property from the bankrupt's estate. Thus
the codes of Argentina,6 Chile,- Bolivia," and Ecuador 9 con-
sider as "creditor-owners" (acreedores de domino), and so en-
titled to revindication, all whose property is held by a bankrupt
to whom title has not passed.' The codes of Costa Rica,"1
4 French, Haitian, Dominican, Venezuelan.
5 See BOISTEL, CoURs DE Daorr COAMERCIAL (1890) 766; DLLOZ, DICTION-
NAIRE PRATIQUE DU DRoT (12th ed.) 628, No. 240; 8 Lyo-CAEN et
RENAULT, TRAIT DU DROIT CoMMERcIAL (1899) § 816; TiHALLER, TnmATg
tLtMENTAIRE Du DROT COMMERCIAL (1922) § 1939; DALLoz, 1900, 2.113
(Court of Appeal of Montpelier, Dec. 12, 1899); DAL0oZ, 1907, 1.2.3 (Court
of Cassation (req.), July 24, 1906. Cf. GUINAZO, LA QuIEBRA EN EL DEnECIIo
CoimuRcIL ARGENTINO (1826) 280, 282.
6 AG. LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, No. 4156, § 91.
7 CHIL. 1509-1510.
s BOL. 650, 651, 653, 654.
9 Ecu. 996.2.
10 The term "acreedores de domninio" is, of course entirely erroneous; an
owner cannot be a creditor or vice versa. See GUINAZfJ, op. cit. supra note
5, at 260; 9 MALAGARRIGA, CODICo DE CoERCIO CO3MSENTADo (1925) 364
The sense of these provisions, however, is entirely clear: they put into a
special category those who claim ownership, and grant tHem the right to
recover possession of the property from the bankrupt's estate.
3.1 COSTA Ric., LEI DE QUIEBRA 30.
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Guatemala,12 Nicaragua,3 El Salvador,14 Honduras,"5 Mexico,1
Cuba,27 and Peru 18 provide that property may be revindicated
when the ownership has not been transferred to the bankrupt by
a legal and irrevocable title. The Colombian Civil Code "I refers
to property belonging to other persons "by reason of ownership"
(por razon de dominio) and the Brazilian law of bankruptcy "
speaks of revindication of "objectos alheios"-things not belong-
ing to the bankrupt.
Besides these general rules, which are sufficiently broad to
cover any particular case of owner's revindication, all codes con-
tain a more detailed enumeration of special cases where mer-
chandise or other property may be revindicated from a bankrupt
holding it without title (deposits, commissions for sale, trans-
portation or delivery, leases, pledges, loans, the possession of
property for administration or for its usufruct, etc.) .2 As a spe-
cial case of revindication by owners, many Latin-American codes
provide also for revindication by wives of property held by bank-
rupt husbands.22 A specific reference to this case of revindica-
tion would seem particularly appropriate in codes adopting, in
whole or in part, the French law of domestic relations, which
gives husbands extensive control and use of the property of the
wife. Under such codes, in the absence of a special rule, the
right of a wife to revindicate property affected by her husband's
right of possession and use might well be questioned. In the
jurisdictions where a husband does not, as a matter of law, have
any special rights over his wife's property, whether brought into
the marriage or acquired during the married life, any special
reference to the right of a wife to revindicate her property from
the estate of a bankrupt husband would seem superfluous, inas-
much as such property could be recovered as her own under the
general rules of revindication. Nevertheless, many Latin-Amer-
ican codes admitting the independent economic status of wives
12 GUAT. 1258.
23Nic. 1109.





29 CoL. Crv. 2484.
20 BRAZIL., LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 138.
21 ARc., LEi No. 4156, § 92; BOL. 653, 1 & 3; Cim. 1510; COL. 1490;
Ecu. 996,2; COSTA RICA 31,1; GUAT. 1259,2; Nic. 1110, 2 & 3; VS:Nz.
996,2; EL SALV. 804,2; HOND. 897,1; PERU 921, 3 & 4; URUG. 1725; BRAZIL
138,1; MEX. 999, 4 & 5; CUBA 909, 4 & 5.
22 ARG. 92,5; BOL. 653,2.; GUAT. 1259,1; PERUV. 921,1; MEX. 999, 1 & 2;
CUB. 909, 1 & 2. In Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay and
Brazil the codes do not specifically refer to the wife's right of revindica-
tion, but it remains available to her as a matter of common law.
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still expressly confer on them the right to revindicate "biencs
propios" from their husbands in bankruptcy.2 3
A few codes refer also to revindication by children of property
in the hands of their fathers, by wards of property in the pos-
session of their guardians, by heirs or legatees of property be-
longing to the estate or legacy. Of course, as stated above,
the enumeration of particular instances of revindication has
no restrictive force, so that any other instance of bailment, even
though it has not been referred to specifically in the statutes,
will afford a sufficient basis for the remedy of revindication in
any jurisdiction.25
B. Revii0ication of Property Sold Under a1 Contract of
Convlitiow.l Sale
Of special interest in this connection is the question whether
under a conditional sales contract, i.e., a contract of sale with
the retention of title by the seller until payment of the price,
the seller is protected by revindication when the bankruptcy of
the buyer intervenes prior to the payment of the price. The
answer to this question in turn depends upon the answer to an-
other-whether or not in French and Latin-American jurisdic-
tions title to personal property may be validly retained under a
conditional sales contract. Upon the latter point these countries
may be divided into four distinct groups, viz.:
(1) Where statutes forbid conditional sales.
(2) Where statutes give full recognition and protection to
conditional sales on substantialy the same basis as in this country.
(3) Where statutes are silent on the question of conditional
sales and their legal effect.
(4) Where statutes refer to conditional sales but contain
no specific rules as to the effect of the bankruptcy of the buyer.
Only one country, Argentina, has a statute expressly for-
bidding contracts of conditional sale. Section 1410 of the
Argentina Civil Code considers sales under the so-called paetum
commissorium (defeasance clause) as sales made with retention
of title until payment, and Section 1408 expressly forbids such
clauses in sales of personal property.-0 This prohibition is a
logical deduction from the peculiar rule of Argentinian Civil Code
under which in the case of the buyer's default, the unpaid seller
may demand only performance (payment of the price plus
23 EL SALv. 804,1; HOND. 897,1; Nic. 1110,1; CosTA RIc. 33.
also Costa Rica and Panama.
24 AnG. 92,4; MEX. 999,3.
25 Svpra note 2.
21 This rule does not apply to commercial transactions, in which pachu.
conmmissoru, is always presumed. ARG. 216.
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interest), not the rescision of the sale and return of the merchan-
dise.27
In the second category belong Peru, Chile and Mexico. In
these three countries statutes have recently been passed 21 pro-
viding for the registration of contracts of sale where the title
is retained by the seller until payment of price (in Peru and
Mexico) or a chattel mortgage executed on the property sold
(in Chile). Under these laws, the rights of a conditional seller
are fully protected, not only in case of the bankruptcy of the
buyer, but also against innocent purchasers from him.
In the same category must also be placed Brazil. Although
there is no law in that country specifically referring to sales on
credit secured by the retention of title until payment, the pro-
visions of the civil code concerning the passing of title in general,
and those relating to contracts of sale in particular, are such as
to protect a conditional seller. Brazilian courts as well as text-
writers have held that in the absence of a specific prohibition in
the statutes clauses in a sales contract retaining title in the
seller (pacta resevati dominii) are valid.29  It is also commonly
admitted that pacta commissoaa30 (defeasance clauses), al-
though they primarily operate as a resolutory condition, may
through the consent of the parties have the legal effect of a
suspensive condition. 31 Consequently, as between the parties
themselves and as against creditors of the bankrupt buyer, the
validity of the title retention clauses in sales contracts seems
to be beyond any doubt. As to the rights of third parties (more
specifically innocent purchasers from the conditional buyer) the
Brazilian Civil Code, diametrically opposed to the provision of
the French Code declaring that en fait de meubles possession vaut
titre,3 2 sets forth in Section 622 that tradition made by a party
who is not the owner does not transfer the title of ownership.
The provision is sufficiently clear to preclude any defense of a
purchaser from a buyer who has not yet acquired title, even
though the purchaser acted in good faith without knowledge of
the defects in the title of his grantor.3 3 The only legal effect
27ARG. Civ. 1463.
28 Peruvian Executive Decree of Sept. 29, 1927, effective as of Oct. 15,
1929; CHmL., LEI No. 4702, Dec. 3, 1929; §§ 1312, 1310 of the new Mexican
(Federal) Civil Code, promulgated Aug. 30, 1928, but not yet in force.
29 6, CARVALHO DE MENDONCA, TRATADO DE DIRETo COMMERCIAL BRAZILIERO
(1927) Pt. 2, p. 160.
30 BRAZIL CIV. 1163.
31 ALVES, CODIGO CIVIL ANNOTADO (1923) 823.
32 FRENCH Civ. 2279.
33 It is advisable to have Brazilian contracts of sale with retention of
title registered in the so-called "registro de titulos, documentos o outros
papeis," in order to make the date of the sale certain and valid against
third parties. BRAZIL, LEI No. 973, Jan. 2, 1903; Decree No. 4775, Feb.
16, 1903, §§ 11, 30; LEI, No. 79, Aug. 26, 1892, § 3.
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of the good faith of the ultimate purchaser is that the subsequent
acquisition of title by the grantor will cure the original defect
and vest a good title in the ultimate purchaser.
Among countries belonging to the third category-where the
statutes contain no reference to conditional sales-France occu-
pies the foremost position. This is due not only to her political
and scientific prestige but also to the fact that in France the
question of the legal effect of such sales has been analyzed most
thoroughly by text writers and passed on in numerous decisions
by the courts. The French law in this regard, therefore, seems
to be well settled.
The overwhelming weight of authority in France is without
question opposed to the recognition of conditional sales both in
regard to third parties and in bankruptcy. The express pro-
vision of Section 2279 of- the French Civil Code, that ca fait de
meubles possessian vaut titre, defeats the conditional seller's
right of revindication as against baiow fide purchasers from the
conditional buyer, if the latter had possession of the property
and delivered it to the ultimate purchaser. The rule of Section
2279 is so clear and absolute in that respect that the possibility
of any other interpretation by the courts seems out of the ques-
tion. But even as between the parties themselves French courts
consistently refuse to recognize the validity of a stipulation for
the retention of title until the payment of price, regardless of
whether the agreement is made in the form of an outright con-'
ditional sales contract or whether it has been dissimulated under
the guise of a hire and purchase agreement.
Although French law considers as legal sales made on sus-
pensive (precedent) condition,3 nevertheless French jurispru-
dence refuses to recognize sales in which transfer of title is made
contingent upon payment of the price as sales made on suspen-
sive condition, the theory being that payment under a sales
contract is an actual and irrevocable obligation lacking the ele-
ment of future uncertainty that must be inherent in a suspen-
sive condition.23 This holding is uncontrovertibly correct from
the viewpoint of civil law. The theory of that law as well as
the codes distinguishes two kinds of conditions upon which an
obligation may be contingent: (a) an event beyond the control
of either party (the so-called "condition casuelle"), e.g., the
death or marriage of a third party, the passing of a law, an
act of government, a meteorological phenomenon, etc.; (b) an
event which depends wholly or partly upon the will of the
34
,"La vente peut etre faite purement et simplement ou sous une condi-
tion soit suspensive soit r6solutoire." FRENCH CnI. 1584.
35 Court of Appeals of Bourges (Dec. 26, 1887), REC. PEIOD. ShIEY,




creditor or debtor under a conditional obligation (the so-called
"condition potestative").30 Payment of the price obviously can-
not be a casual condition. It might be considered as a potesta-
tive condition, but if the obligation to pay in a conditional sales
contract were a *purely potestative condition, i.e., an act the
performance of which depends exclusively on the arbitrary will
of the party obligated to pay (the buyer), then the very sale
would be void under Section 1174 of the Civil Code. But of
course, although payment of price may be considered as an event
depending upon the will of the buyer (in the sense that the
buyer may or may not pay), still it is not a potestative condition
at all; it is not even a relatively potestative or mixed condi-
tion.37 The conditional buyer has no free election between pay-
ment and non-payment with the resulting transfer or non-trans-
fer of title; he must pay unconditionally. The performance is
not discretionary but obligatory for a conditional buyer; the con-
ditional sales contract is conditional only for the seller. The
conditional seller, instead of voiding the sale and repossessing
the property, may at his election affirm the sale and demand per-
formance by the buyer, i.e., payment of the price. Thus pay-
ment of the price in a conditional sales contract is not a condition
precedent of the sale, but an unconditional obligation of the buyer
that is one of the essentials of the transaction, without which
there would be no sale.
Having refused to consider sales in which the passing of title
is conditioned upon the payment of the price as sales under a
suspensive condition, French courts logically regard such con-
tracts as completed sales under a resolutory (subsequent) condi-
tion, giving the seller the alternative right to rescind the sale
and repossess the property or to claim payment."5 Consequently,
36FRENCH Civ. 1169, 1170; Cf. BOL. Civ. 760, 761; CHIL. Civ. 1477;
VENEZ. Civ. 1225; COL. Civ. 1534; MEx. Civ. 1334; Cu.z. Civ. 1115.
37 FRENCH CIV. 1171.
38 DALnoz 1885, 2.220 (Court of Appeal of Amiens, Mar. 12, 1884);
DALLOZ 1903, V.779 (Court of Appeal of Paris, Apr. 3, 1903); see also
1 GAZ=TE DU PALAIS (1903) 1.619. This rule holds as well established law
only in civil cases. In internal revenue as -well as criminal cases French
courts are rather inclined to uphold conditional sales contracts. DALLOZ
1887, 1.500 (Court of Cassation (civ.), Feb. 22, 1887); DALLOZ 1905,
1.486 (Court of Cassation (civ.), June 19, 1903). But,. of course, these
decisions have no bearing on civil and, more specifically, bankruptcy cases.
It must be said, however, that a few decisions have been rendered even
by the civil courts upholding the title retaining effect of conditional sales
contracts made in the form of hire-purchase contracts. Court of Appeal
of Paris, Mar. 9, 1904, quoted in 59 PANDECTES FANQAISES, No. 56, p. 9. pub-
lished in JOURNAL DES TRm. DE COMMERCE, No. 16111, p. 522; Commercial
Court of Marseilles, Jan. 31, 1894, quoted in 59 PANDECTES FnANCAISsS,
No. 53j p. 8. But these decisions have no weight of generally accepted
authority behind them. See also 2 PLANIOL, TRAiT, ULEMENTAIRE DU Du oT
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in case of bankruptcy, property sold under a conditional sales
contract, either express or disguised in the form of a hire and
purchase agreement,39 must be considered as rightfully belong-
ing to the bankruapt buyer ab initio under a valid title and
simply subject to a pactum comiassorim-a clause providing
for rescission in case of non-payment. This latter clause, in fact,
it is not even necessary to include in the contract because it is
always implied in bilateral contracts in general, and contracts of
sale in particular. 0
Whether express or implied, pactu n c2nzmisso2imn affords
sufficient protection to the unpaid seller as against the buyer
himself and his attaching creditors, not innocent thid parties."1
But, unfortunately for the conditional seller, the clause is of no
value in the event of the buyer's bankruptcy. In such a case
Section 550 of the French Commercial Code expressly deprives
the unpaid seller of two remedies granted him by Section
2102(4) of the Civil Code, viz., (a) revindication and (b) privi-
iUge (lien) for the amount of the unpaid price. This provision,
together with Sections 576 and 577 of the Commercial Code, the
French courts construe strictly against the seller. For they deny
him any of the remedies of the Civil Code against the bankrupt
buyer and compel him to be satisfied with only such remedies as
are available to him under the bankruptcy law, -2 viz., (a) a
special form of revindication identical with our stoppage in
transitu,-3 and (b) retention of the merchandise if it has not yet
been forwarded - with the incident right to rescind the contract
if the syndic does not exercise his privilege to demand the per-
formance of the contract against the payment or guarantee of
payment.45 Thus the unpaid seller loses in bankruptcy the right
of rescission which Section 1654 of the Civil Code gives him
Crvm (1923) § 1526 bis; LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. siepra note 5,
at § 838; THALLER, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 1947.
39 See Court of Algiers, Jan. 28, 1903 (quoted in 59 PANDEOTES FILN-
QAISES, No. 55, p. 9, holding that a contract under which title vas to
pass upon payment of all the agreed installments wxas a sale on install-
ment basis and not a hire-purchase contract, and, although valid betwveen
parties it could not be opposed to creditors in bankruptcy. See also DALLOz
1895, 2.92 (Court of Appeals of Amiens, Apr. 28, 1894), holding that
the court has the right to construe a hire-purchase contract as a sale, if
it has been made with the purpose of withholding the property from
creditors.
4 0 FRENCH Civ. 1184, 1654.
41FRENCH Civ. 2279.
4-0 DALLoz 1900, 1.161 (Court of Cassation (civ.), Dec. 24, 1889) ; D,%LLoz
1897, 2,464 (Court of Appeal of Douai, July 30, 1896).
43 FRENCH 576.
44 FRENCH 577.
45 FRENCH 578. See LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. sup"a note 5, at §
861; THALLE , op. cit. snpra note 5, at § 1947.
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against a defaulting buyer. In view of this fact any private
transaction intended to give the unpaid seller protection outside
of the remedies of the Commercial Code must a fortiori be in-
effective in case of the buyer's bankruptcy, even though the
vendor should call himself only a conditional seller and attempt
to retain the title by a clause which in substance is nothing more
than a pactum commissorium.4 6
Among the Latin-American countries Bolivia, Venezuela,
Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica, Mexico (under the
present civil code) and Cuba have, like France, no laws refer-
ring to conditional sales. Of these contries, only in Cuba has
the question of the legal effect of contracts of conditional sale
been considered in its entirety by the courts. Although the
Cuban Civil Code does not differ substantially from the French
law in the matter of conditional obligations, and although French
jurisprudence as a general rule has always been of great influence
on the development of Cuban law, the question has been decided
in Cuba in a manner quite opposed to the holdings of the French
courts.
Under the influence of several rather liberal decisions of
Spanish courts, maintaining the validity of title retaining
clauses, 47 the Supreme Court of Cuba in a leading decision held
that a provision for the reservation of title until payment is a
clause not prohibited by law and, therefore, valid against the
buyer regardless of any registration 8r publicity.4 In another
case the Audiencia (Court of Second Instance) of Havana held
that retention of title under a conditional sales contract was valid
as against the purchaser. at an auction sale, and this in spite
of the precise rule of Section 464 of the Civil Code expressly pro-
tecting purchasers at auction sales.49 It must be pointed out,
however, that this was a holding from which no appeal has been
taken so that the principle expressed in that decision has not
been passed upon by the Supreme Court of Cuba.50 Nevertheless,
46 See LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 838; TIIALLEE,
op. cit. supra note 5, at § 1947.
47 Jose Pillado v. Luisa Blanchard, Tribunal Supremo (Feb. 16, Mar. 30,
1894); especially Ignacio Tey v. Societad Anglo Espanola de Motores,
Tribunal Supremo (Mar. 6, Dec. 9, 1906); also Antonio Puente Crespo v.
Sergio Novales, Tribunal Supremo (Dec. 13, 1911, Mar. 11, 1912).
48 In re Zayas Abren Commercial Co. v. Jaime Galceran S. en C. (Jan.
19, 1926).
49 "Possession of personal property acquired in good faith is equivalent
to title. However, those who have lost personal property, or have been
deprived of it illegally, may revindicate it from the possessor. But if
the possessor of personal property lost or illegally taken away acquired
it in good faith at public sale, the owner will have no right to obtain the
restitution without reimbursing the price paid for it." CUB. 464.
50 Sentencia No. 820 por la sala de lo civil de ]a Audiencia do la Habana
(Dec. 4, 1924). This decision entirely disregards § 464 of the Civil Code
[Vol. 40
REVINDICATION IN BANKRUPTCY
these decisions have been accepted by Cuban courts and the legal
profession as binding precedents, the force of which, in the opin-
ion of two eminent Cuban lawyers, Bustamante and Machado,
extends even over the case of the sale of the property by the
conditional buyer to an innocent third party51 As a result,
conditional sales with title retention clauses are now becoming
frequent in Cuban business life.
These decisions have been obviously dictated by the laudable
desire of the Cuban courts to meet the necessities of modern
business conditions and to foster local and foreign commerce
through the powerful medium of conditional sales contracts.
Nevertheless, if these decisions are actually intended to sustain
revindication under a conditional sales contract against innocent
purchasers from the conditional buyer, then their correctness
is more than questionable, both from a legal and a practical
point of view. From the theoretical aspect this construction
is quite irreconcilable with the express rule of Cuban law giving
title to those who acquire personal property in good faith from
one having actual possession.52 Yet in these decisions no attempt
was made to explain why this rule, which knows no exception
save in the case of lost or stolen property, should not apply to
conditional sales. Practically speaking, the novel principle in-
troduced by the decisions in question into Cuban law will, in
the final analysis, probably prejudice the real interests of every-
day economic life more than it will encourage trade. As there
is no provision for the registration of contracts of conditional
sale in Cuba, purchasers will never have the assurance that they
will not be subject to revindication because of an undisclosed
conditional sales contract, and dishonest merchants will have
a very effective means of defrauding their creditors by the
simple expedient of making in advance a contract of conditional
sale with an obliging friend or relative.
In lexico the courts have not yet definitely adjudicated in
its entirety the question of the validity of title-retaining con-
tracts; but the trend of legal thought there leans toward the
recognition of these contracts as valid, even under the present
civil code.53  The absence from the Mlexican code of a rule
and is based exclusively on a very questionable principle that in auction
sales the judge conducting the sale is no more than a legal agent of the
seller, and, therefore, cannot transfer more rights than the latter himself
has.
- See Dr. Luis Machado's report published by Division of Commercial
Laws, Department of Commerce, and Dr. Antonio S. de Bustamante's com-
ment on this report published by the American Chamber of Commerce in
Cuba, Comparative Law Series, No. 152, 19.
Z CuB. Crv. 464.
See especially In re Wagner & Levine v. Nombela, Federal Supreme
Court, 1st Dep't (Jan. 3, 1907). In this decision the court sustained tht
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analogous to the French Section 2279, of course facilitates the
recognition of conditional sales as valid. On the other hand,
the Mexican Civil Code now in force seems to protect the inno-
cent purchaser against claims that are based on a defect in
the title of his grantor. In that respect Section 1352 of the
Code expressly provides that "in regard to personal property,
whether or not there is an express agreement, the resolution
of the contract of sale (because of non-payment of the price)
can never take place against a third party that may have acquired
this property in good faith." In the writer's opinion, this Sec-
tion should stand in the way of granting to the conditional seller
the right to reclaim the property for non-payment of the price
from an ultimate purchaser who has acquired the property in
good faith from the conditional buyer. As to the legal effect
of title-retaining contracts in the case of the buyer's bankruptcy,
it seems that the Mexican courts have finally and irrevocably
adjudicated that such contracts are fully valid against creditors
and that, the conditional seller may revindicate the property
from the bankrupt's estate.
In other countries where statutes are silent on the question
of conditional sales, there has been no adjudication on the matter.
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that in the five years since
the Supreme Court of Cuba rendered its famous decision of
January 19, 1926, the example of this court has not been
followed in other countries or the question of conditional sales
even raised for consideration in local courts, it may be concluded
that courts, lawyers and business men continue unanimously to
adhere to the French theory and practice, and do not encourage
conditional sales contracts in their pure form.
Leaving aside the question whether the courts in these coun-
tries would construe a sale with transfer of title deferred until
payment as a sale under a suspensive or resolutory condition,
it is practically beyond doubt that no revindication in bank-
ruptcy would lie in these countries on such contracts. The seller
could claim the merchandise already delivered as a "creditor-
owner" (acreedor de dominio) only if there were a statute or
well established adjudication recognizing conditional sales
contracts as obligations valid in bankruptcy. In the absence
validity of contracts of conditional sale on the ground that the law per-
mits sales on a suspensive condition. In support of this theory, the court,
referring to the French law as a supreme authority for the legislation of
the modern civilized world, cited Section 1584 of the French Civil Code
providing that sales may be made on suspensive condition. In quoting this
section, however, the Mexican Supreme Court entirely failed to take notice
of the unanimous and very definite decisions of French courts interpreting
this section in which it was held that payment of the price can never be
considered a suspensive condition, but that it is an unconditional obligation
of the buyer without which there would be no sale at all.
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of such authority there would be no reason not to apply the very
express provision of the bankruptcy laws that where there has
been a.sale on credit terms the seller may reclaim the merchan-
dise sold only if it has not been actually delivered to the buyer
(stoppage in transitu).
The fourth category comprises Ecuador, Columbia, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, Honduras, and Chile (before the enactment of the
Law of November 15, 1929)-countries where codes contain
express provisions referring to sales with the retention of title
by the seller until the payment of price, without reference, how-
ever, to the validity of such sales in case of the buyer's bank-
ruptcy. These provisions, practically identical in all the codes,
treat such sales from two different points of view, which at first
glance may be misleading.
A sale with retention of title is considered in these codes as
a qualified form of "tradiciote' (actual or symbolical delivery
transferring title). In that respect, the codes provide that "tra-
dition may transfer the title of ownership under suspensive or
resolutory condition, as may be agreed upon. Upon delivery by
the seller, the ownership of the thing sold is transferred, although
the price has not been paid, undess the scller his reserved title
until payment, or until the fulfillment of a condition." , This
rule seems to establish beyond any doubt the principle that under
contracts of conditional sale title does not pass until the payment
of the price.
Besides the above quoted rule, however, the same codes, con-
tain in the chapters on sales, the following special provision:
"The clause under which the transfer of title is deferred until
payment shall produce no other effect than that of the alterna-
tive stated in the precedent section (either dcmanzd of payment,
or rescission of sale); and after the seller has paid the price, in
any case grants of the property and rights that may be estab-
lished on it in the meantime shall remain in force.",7 There
is an apparently glaring contradiction between these two pro-
visions. Under a clear and express rule of the law of "tradi-,
5"La tradicion puede transferir el donminio bajo la condicion suspensiva
o resolutoria con tal que se exprese. Verificada la entrega por el vendedor
se transfiere el dominio de la cosa vendida aunque no se haya pagado el
precio, a zmeos que el vendedr se haya ceservado cl dominio hasta el Pago
o el cumplimento de una condicion." CniL. Civ. 680; Ecu. Ci%. 669; COL.
CiM. 750; EL SALV. CIV. 661; HOND. Civ. 707.
55
"La clausula de no transferirse el dominio sino en virtud de la paga
del precio no producira otro efecto que el de la demanda alternativa enun-
ciada en el articulo precedente (e:ijir el precio o la ersolucion de la Venta);
y pagando el comprador el precio, subsistiran en todo caso les enajenaciones
que hubiere hecho de la cosa o los derechos que hubiere constituido sobre
ello en el tiempo intermedio." CHIn. Civ. 1874; CoL. Civ. 1931; Ecu. Civ.
1865; EL SAMY. 1676.
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cion," conditional sales are contracts under suspensive condition
and transfer no title until payment; under an equally clear and
express rule of the sales law, conditional sales are or.dinary,
perfected sales under a pactum commissorium-just as any sale
on credit terms, regardless of retention of title, is always pre-
sumed to have been made with a tacit recognition of the seller's
right to rescind for non-payment.
The key to the proper understanding of this contradiction may
be found in another provision of these codes, referring to the
effect of retention of title in regard to third persons, which
appears in the chapters relating to obligations under condition,
Here it is declared that "if anyone owning a movable thing on
eims or under a suspensive or resolutory condition alienates
it, there will lie no right of revindication against third persons
possessing it in good faith." 56 In other words, the retention
of title operates as a suspensive condition only between the
parties. As against third parties it is no more than a simple
resolutory condition and does not vitiate the title of those who
acquire rights to the property in good faith. But even as be-
tween the parties themselves the conditional seller has no other
remedies save either to demand performance or rescind the sale
and reclaim the thing sold, i.e., the usual rights belonging to a
seller under a pactum commissoyium.
How may this construction affect the rights of a conditional
seller in case of the bankruptcy of the buyer? Inasmuch as the
law clearly recognizes the validity of the retention of title under
a conditional sales contract, and inasmuch as creditors in bank-
ruptcy can have no greater rights than the bankrupt himself,
it must be considered that the conditional seller is "acreedor de
dominio" and as such is entitled to revindication. The writer,
however, must confess that he knows of no decision of a court
on this specific question, and, therefore, his opinion rests on no
authority other than the logical construction of the provisions
of the codes. Moreover, it is possible that due to the over-
whelming influence of French law and jurisprudence in Latin-
American countries this question may be decided against the
seller, despite these provisions of the codes. Such a result might
be reached on the theory that in case of the buyer's bankruptcy
all remedies of the seller are to be sought exclusively in the
commercial codes, which limit the rights of an unpaid seller
on credit terms, as to merchandise that has left his possession,
strictly to stoppage in transitu. This theory, in fact, seems
to have been tacitly accepted by the courts and practicing
56 "Si el que debe una cosa mueble a plazo o bajo una condicion suspen-
siva o reslutioria le enajena no habza derecho de reivindicarla contra ter-
ceros procedentes de buena fe." CHIL. Civ. 1490; ECu. Civ. 1480; COL. CIV.
1548; EL SALV. Civ. 1351; cf. HOND. Civ. 869.
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lawyers. (We would not include text writers, because there are
only a few textbooks in the countries of this group, and in these
few the question has not been discussed at all.) This may be
the natural inference from the fact that no attempts appear to
have been made to make and test in the courts any undisguised
conditional sales contracts. There is, in short, no certainty that
such contracts will be recognized by the courts in bankruptcy
cases otherwise than through the enactment of special statutes,
as has been done in Peru, Chile and Mexico.
Inasmuch as credit sales with retention of title appear to
answer a need that is acutely felt in modern economic life,
especially in connection with installment sales, a substitute for
these tabooed contracts had to be found. Numerous attempts have
been made to dissimulate these sales in the more or less trans-
parent disguise of the so-called hire and purchase contracts,
deposit receipts with option to buy, irregular forms of pledges
(Prenda agraria or industrial in Argentina, Uruguay, Guate-
mala and Costa Rica), and loans secured by personal property
(prestamo con garantia. mobiliaria in the Dominican Republic).
This again tends to indicate that the lawyers in Latin-American
countries are not inclined to believe that in the absence of ex-
press statutes the courts may admit the validity of title-retain-
ing contracts in bankruptcy cases. Although in France these
dissimulated substitute contracts have been consistently treated
by the courts as conditional sales transferring title under resolu-
tory condition and having no effect against third parties, it seems
that Latin-American courts have been more liberal in that re-
spect. At least the writer is not aware of any leading decisions
upholding the French viewpoint and defeating any of the sub-
stitute contracts described above. On the contrary, very recently
the Buenos Aires Commercial Court rendered a decision refusing
to consider a hire-purchase contract as a dissimulated sale with a
"pactum conmmissoriumn" (and, therefore, invalid under Argen-
tinian law), but allowing it full force against the creditors of the
conditional buyer as a lawful title-retaining contract. This deci-
sion, however, gave no consideration to the crucial question
whether such a contract would be upheld against a bona, fide
purchaser of the merchandise delivered under it to the prospec-
tive buyer.-7
C. Prerequisites of Revindication
The exercise by the owner of the right of revindication is predi-
cated upon certain formal conditions.
(1) The property must be actually among the bankrupt's
57Matter of the National Paper and Type Co in re Stocker y Cia. v.
Guillermo Kupperschmid (Dec. 4, 1929).
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assets.-8 If it-has been lawfully acquired by a bona fide third
party it cannot be revindicated."9 But a question has arisen as
to the effect of an executory contract of sale made by the bankrupt
when the bankruptcy interevenes before the delivery of the prop-
erty to the buyer. In this connection two possibilities must be
considered. First the bankrupt could have the right to sell the
merchandise as a consignment agent, holder in irregular deposit,
or otherwise. Since, the bankrupt was privileged to transfer
title, he must be deemed to have lawfully alienated 'the property
and the title must be considered to have passed to the purchaser
under the contract. Consequently the possibility of obtaining
revindication must be eliminated, the remedy of the owner being
limited to reclaiming from the purchaser the price of the thing
sold if it has not been paid prior to the bankruptcy. A different
question arises when the bankrupt had no right to sell the prop.
erty, this situation including all cases of regular deposit, lease,
usufructus, etc. In some jurisdictions the sale of personal prop-
erty is null and void if the seller is not the owner or is not author-
ized to sell by the owner-the system of the Code Napoleon.00
In these jurisdictions the question is easily answered. The sale,
being made by a non-owner, can have no legal effect unless it has
been accompanied by an actual "tradition" (legal delivery) which
would confer title upon the purchaser, not because of the contract
of sale but 'because of the rule protecting title acquired by an
innocent purchaser from the actual possessor. Consequently,
an innocent purchaser cannot by setting up a mere executory
contract made with a non-owner defeat the suit of the owner
for the revindcation of his property.21
But what would be the solution of the problem in jurisdictions
which, following the old Roman theory, consider a sales contract
simply as a contract to sell, a promise to deliver the property and
a warranty of the undisturbed possession thereof? Q Although
in these jurisdictions the sale of another's property is a valid
contract, it is valid only in the sense that the buyer may demand
5s FRENCH 575, Doi. 575; HAIT. 575; BOL. 653; CmL. 1509; PERUV. 920;
GUAT. 1258; Nic. 1109; EL SALV. 803; COSTA RIC. 30; HOND. 896. SeO
LYON-CAEN et RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 795; 1 PLANIOL op. cit.
supra note 38, at § 2717 f; BOISTEL, op. cit. =pra note 5, at 767.
59 See supra note 2.
60 FRENCH CIv. 1582, 1549; BOL. CIV. 1018; EL SALV. 1619; COSTA RICA
1061; MEX. CIV. 1811-1830; URUG. Civ. 1445. Cf. CABARA, LA COMPRAVENTA
CIVIL Y MERCANTIL (1926) 106. In connection with non-commercial sales
ruled by civil law only, see ARG. Civ. 1363; NIc. CIV. 1530, 1568; VENE.
Civ. 1525.
G See LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 795; 2 BOULAY-
PATY, DES FAILLITES ET BANQUEROUTES (1828) 359. -
62 CHIL. CIV. 1815; COL. Civ. 1875; ECU. CIV. 1805; COL. CIV. 1605; PAN.
Civ. 1227; URUG. CIV. 1669. In regard to commercial sales only, see Ana.
450, 453; VENEZ. 141; NiC. 843.
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performance thereunder from the sellerr 3 i. c., the seller must
either secure the thing from the owner and legally deliver it
to the buyer or pay him damages. The actual owner remains
fully protected under all codes adopting the Roman system and
does not lose his right of revindication as long as the property
has not been delivered to the innocent purchaser.
If the property has been pledged, the revindicating owner will
be obliged to compensate the innocent pledgee in full as a condi-
tion precedent to the recovery of the propert,.5
(2) The property must remain in substantially the same con-
dition as it was delivered to the bankrupt. If goods have been
worked into a different thing (grain into flour, flaxvinto canvas,
etc.) the transformation (speciflcatio) will bar the remedy of
revindication. Or if the property has been inseparably connected
with another thing in such a way as to make a new whole (mirror
built into a wall, jewels put into the movement of a watch, etc.),
the "'adjunctioi'" will have the same effect, should the connection
be essential and permanent, and the principal thing belong to the
bankrupt.
(3) The property must be recognizable. A basic principle
of civil law is that only non-fungible property (corpus ccrt um,
corps certain, cuepo cierto) can be revindicated. As a general
rule, fungible, generic property (money, commodities, etc.) is
not revindicable unless, of course, it has been individualized
by delivery in sealed containers, bales, cases, or has been other-
wise rendered specific and recognizable. The concensus of legal
opinion seems to be unanimous upon this point."o As will be
seen later, however, several codes admit a rather important
exception to this strict rule in regard to funds (cadales) de-
posited with the bankrupt in trust to be applied to special pur-
poses, and not to be included in the current account.
Money (as well as other fungible things) cannot be revindi-
cated if it has been accepted by the bankrupt prior to his bank-
ruptcy. But if money belonging to or due a claimant has been
paid into the estate after the declaration of bankruptcy, then it
will be refunded to the owner, not, of course, by way of revindi-
cation, but simply as a preferred claim. It is in fact a debt
of the estate itself, not of the bankrupt.
(4) The owner must prove his title. This principle is so
self-evident as to require no authority for its support. As to
63 See supra note 63.
- LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 795.
f5 Am. 1485, 1489; URUG. 1723, 1728.
r6 LYoN-CAEN ETRENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at §§ 790, 800, 81T; ef.
Serna y Reus cited by LozA o, CODIGO DE COILIEuICx0 DE LAS E. E. U. 3L
(1901) 411, 412. See also DALLOz 1898, 2.172 and 1900, 1.312 (Court of
Appeals of Paris, Feb. 5, 1898).
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the procedure of proving the revindicant's rights, codes usually
provide that the owner may exercise his right of revindication
only upon its recognition by the creditors or, if it is disputed
by the syndic or the creditors, upon adjudication by the court.01
IlI REVINDICATION OF FUNDS AND NEGOTIABLE PAPER
A. Revindication of Funds
Theoretically speaking, funds or money deposited with the bank-
rupt, being not a corpus certum, but fungible, generic property,
are not revindicable unless, of course, they have been in some
way physically individualized." The French Commercial Code,
and, under its influence, the codes of Haiti, Dominican Republic,
Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela strictly adhere
to this rule and do not permit revindication of money received
by the bankrupt prior to the declaration of bankruptcy, even
though it was not paid to the bankrupt under some agreement,
but simply deposited in trust. Other Latin-American codes are
more liberal in this respect. These admit revindication of, or more
properly speaking, priority of claim for,00 funds from the bank-
rupt's estate where these funds have been sent to the bankrupt,
apart from the current account, for the payment of obligations
incurred by the depositor at the place of residence of the bank-
rupt, or for delivery to a definite person for the account and on
behalf of the creditor-in other words, delivered by the latter
to the bankrupt in trust.o The Colombian commercial law even
goes so far as to admit generally revindication of funds de-
posited with the bankrupt to the order (disponibles a la orden)
of the depositor, if no interest has been stipulated on them.1
B. Revindication of Negotiable Paper
Negotiable paper as corpus certum is revindicable, even without
any specific code provision, provided it can be shown that title
thereto has not been passed to the bankrupt, as where drafts,
promissory notes, checks, or shares of stock, have been deposited
with him simply for safe-keeping on behalf of the owner without
any further purpose or stipulation. The necessity of a special
provision appears only when, in addition to physical possession,
control over the negotiable paper has been transferred to the
67 FRENCH 579; Dom. 579; HAiT. 579; Ecu. 999; Nic. 1109; GUAT. 1258;
VENEZ. 998; Ho-ND. 896; EL SALV. 803; PERUV. 920; BRAZILj 139; M X. 998;
CUB. 908.
68 See COSTA RIC. 32; ARG. LEI DE QUIEBRA 93.
69 See Serna y Reus in LozANo, op. cit. supra note 66.
70 BOL. 653, 4; COL. 165, 3; COsTA Ric. 31, 3; GUAT. 1259, 5; NIC. 1110, 5;
HOND. 897, 5; EL SALV. 804, 5; PERUV. 921, 6; MEX. 999, 7; CUB. 909, 6.
71 Law No. 51 (1918) § 22.
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bankrupt. The legal effect in bankruptcy of such a transfer will
depend upon whether: (1) the negotiable paper was delivered to
the bankrupt for collection only, either by special, limited en-
dorsement or under a separate mandate; or whether (2) the
paper was (prima facie) unconditionally endorsed to the order
of the bankrupt.
The solutions to these two questions in Latin-American codes
do not substantially differ. Under practically all of the codes,
bills of exchange, notes and other negotiable instruments may be
revindicated if they have been delivered to the bankrupt for col-
lection only, without transferring to him title to the paper
("sin endorso o expression que transmitiere la propiedad"), the
proceeds to be kept in triist at the disposal of the claimant, or
to be applied for some definite purpose.2 In other words, re-
vindication will be available if title to the negotiable paper has
not actually passed to the bankrupt. If a draft has not been
endorsed at all, but only delivered with a power of attorney
to collect, or if it has been endorsed expressly for collection,
then the right of the owner to revindicate it is beyond any
question.
But what if a draft has been delivered to the bankrupt with a
regular endorsement? Here there are two possible situations
to be considered. The draft may have been regularly endorsed
to the bankrupt as a consideration in some transaction between
the endorser and the bankrupt; then it becomes a part of the
estate and is not revindicable. But it frequently happens that
the draft, although endorsed without qualification, has been
in fact delivered to the bankrupt only for collection (or other-
wise) without any intention that the title thereto should actually
pass to the bankrupt. Such endorsement should not exclude
revindication if it can be clearly proved that under the agree-
ment between the parties the bankrupt, despite the unconditional
endorsement, was not to acquire title, but was simply to collect
on the draft and hold the proceeds in trust for the owner.
This is seemingly contradicted by provisions of several Latin-
American codes under which revindication of negotiable paper
is permitted only if the paper has been delivered to the bankrupt
without endorsement or statement transferring property."
Actually, however, these provisions do not preclude the possibility
of revindication of endorsed paper; they simply limit it to cases
where the title was not intended to pass to the bankrupt. The
interpretation of these provisions should not be extended beyond
these limits to exclude proof of the actual agreement between
7 2 ARG., LEI DE QUIEBRA 92, 2, 112; BOL. 653, 3; CHIL. 1509; COL. 165,
2; Ecu. 996, 1; COSTA Ric. 31, 2; GUAT. 1259, 4; Nic. 1110, 4; VEN=E. 996"
1; HOND. 897, 4; EL SAv. 804, 4; PMUV. 925, 5; BBAZIL. 138, 3.
73 See supra note 72.
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the parties; the presumption which the provisions establish
against the owner is not juris et de jure, but an ordinary pre-
sumption juris tantum which may be rebutted by proof. Con-
sequently, the only difference between a draft endorsed for collec-
tion and a draft endorsed without qualification will be in the
distribution of the burden of proof. In the first case, to retain
the draft in the bankrupt's estate, the trustees would have to
prove that despite the qualified endorsement it belonged to the
estate; ili the latter case, in order to revindicate it from the
estate, the alleged owner would have to prove that it had been
delivered to the bankrupt only for collection and that the title
did not pass.74
If there has been a regular current account kept between the
owner and the bankrupt, entries in that account might be con-
sidered as conclusive evidence. If a regularly endorsed draft
had been credited to the owner's account, this would establish
the bankrupt's title and defeat revindication. On the other hand,
if a draft, despite the regular endorsement, had been left outside
of the current account, this should operate as prima facie proof
of the retention of title by the owner and make the draft re-
vindicable.
In order to be revindicable, negotiable paper must actually
exist in the bankrupt's estate (or be held for him by his agents
and bailees). Revindication will not lie if title to these instru-
ments has been transferred by the bankrupt to third persons or
the instruments surrendered to the payee against payment. In
the latter case, however, revindication of the amount paid may
be possible if the local statute admits the revindication of funds
and the terms on which the payment was collected by the bank-
rupt are within the statute (permitting the revindication of funds
which are to be kept apart from the current account subject to
the claimant's order, or to be applied for special purposes indi-
cated by the latter).
The revindication of negotiable paper payable to the bearer
will generally be governed by the same rules. The proof of
title may be made more difficult by the fact that the paper is
transferable without endorsement, but if the owner can prove
that he delivered the paper payable "to the bearer" to the bank-
rupt for a special purpose without the intention of passing title
(as may be very often the case with the deposit of such paper
74 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. supr note 5, at § 810; BOISTEL, op.
-t. supra note 5, at 520, 766. See DALLOZ 1899, 2.89 (Court of Appeal of
Chambery, June 7, 1886) and note by M. Claro. In that decision the court
held that endorsed paper may be revindicated if it is proved that it has
been delivered to the bankrupt for a special purpose, such as collection, or




with a bank) then revindication will lie7-
IV. REVINDICATION BY THE UNPAID SELLER
Strictly speaking, revindication can be exercised only by the
owner against a holder who retains property unlawfully. Bank-
ruptcy laws in all the jurisdictions under consideration, how-
ever, extend this remedy under certain restrictions and condi-
tions to the unpaid seller, regardless of the fact that the latter,
having allowed the title to pass to the bankrupt, retains only a
claim for the price and should, again strictly speaking, be treated
as an ordinary general creditor. In order better to understand
how this specific remedy operates in bankruptcy it may be well
fast to consider the remedies of the unpaid seller in cases which
do not involve bankruptcy.
A. Remedies of the Unpaid Seller in Civil Codes
The remedies of the unpaid seller under the civil codes are four-
fold: (1) retention, (2) resolution (rescission), (3) revindi-
cation, and (4) privilege (lien). The first two are common to all
jurisdictions; the last two, are peculiar to the French legal system
and, of Latin American codes, adopted only by the Bolivian Code.
(1) The right of retention belongs to one who sells for cash
in all cases where the price has not been paid. The seller is not
obligated to deliver the property except upon payment, and,
therefore, may retain it until he is paid. The remedy is, of course,
ordinarily not available to the seller on credit terms, the very
substance of a credit sale being the delivery of the property
before payment. But if between the time of sale and the de-
livery of the property the economic condition of the buyer be-
comes so precarious as obviously to jeopardize the recovery of
the price by the seller, then the latter also may exercise the right
of retention and refuse delivery unless the buyer pays or gives
a guaranty of payment.
The codes differ somewhat as to the contingency upon which
the right of retention by a seller on credit terms is predicated.
Under French law the buyer must be declared bankrupt or found
civilly insolvent (en faillitg ou ftait dc deconfiture); the same
rule prevails in the Bolivian and Venezuelan codes. Under the
laws of Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras, Costa Rica, Argentina,
Mexico, Cuba and Brazil, formal bankruptcy is not mentioned as
a condition precedent to retention, and the buyer must be simply
75Cf. DAImroz 1889, 1.207 (Court of Cassation (req.), Jan. 9, 1888).
See also DALLOZ 1902, 1.473 (Court of Cassation (Civ.), Nov. 27, 1900),
in which case a paper payable to the bearer was found among the assets
of a bankrupt with an inscription that it belonged to a third person. In
the absence of evidence of fraud, this was found to be a good proof of
title and the revindication7 was allowed.
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found in "estado del insolvencia." The codes of Chile, Peru,
Ecuador, Colombia and El Salvador go further and admit reten-
tion merely if the buyer's economic condition (fortuna) has be-
come weakened to such an extent that there, is danger of the
seller losing the price.70
(2) Resolution (r6solution, r'esolucion, rescissao), or the right
to rescind a sale for non-payment of the price, is a remedy which
the civil law extends to an unpaid seller regardless of whether he
has sold for cash or on credit and regardless of whether the prop-
erty still remains in his hands or has been delivered to the buyer.
It is not a remedy peculiar to sales alone, but is generally avail-
able to every creditor ii a bilateral contract, who, in the event
of non-performance by the debtor, has the implied right either to
demand performance or to rescind the contract and claim dam-
ages. In addition to the general rule of rescission of bilateral
contracts for non-performance, however, all the codes under con-
sideration contain specific provisions for the rescission of sales
upon non-payment by the buyer.7 7 Some of these predicate the
right of resolution upon a short period of notice to the buyer,
but in most of the civil law jurisdictions an unpaid seller may
exercise the right immediately upon default.
Upon resolution of a sale, the parties to the contract are re-
stored to their original status and title to the property reverts
to the seller. If the property has not been delivered to the
buyer the remedy is perfect; it requires no further process of
law, and title remains absolute against everybody including third
parties who, in the interim, may have acquired rights through
the buyer. If the property has been delivered to the buyer,
however, the seller, having exercised his right of resolution,
will have to revindicate it as his own from the hands of the
buyer or a grantee who took it knowing of the non-payment of
76FRENCH CIv. 1612, 1613; Dom. Civ. 1612, 1613; HALT. Civ. 1397, 1398;
3BoL. Civ. 1031, 1032; VENEZ. Civ. 1534; Nic. Civ. 2594; PAP. Civ. 1236, 1237;
HOND. Civ. 1623, 1624; COSTA Ric. Civ. 1072, 1073; ARG. Civ. 1452, 1453;
MEx. Civ. 2856, 2857 (new 2286, 2287); CuB. Civ. 1466, 1467; BRAZIL. CIv.
1130, 1131; CHIn. Civ. 1286; PERuv.. Civ. 1378, 1379, 1381; Ecu. Civ. 1817;
COL. Civ. 1882; EL SALv. Civ. 1629; PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 38, at
§ 1538; THALLER, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 1943.
77 FRENCH Civ. 1184, 1654; Dom. CIV. 1184, 1654; HAIT. Civ. 973, 1439;
BOL. Cirv. 775, 1067; VENEZ. Civ, 1231, 1573; CHIL. CIV. 1873, 1877, 1879;
PERMUV. Civ. 1388, 1389, 1390; Ecu. CIV. 1479, 1864; Nic. Civ. 1885, 2262;
4C0L. Civ. 1346, 1930, 1935; PAN. Civ. 1009, 1275; HOND. CIV. 1386, 1664;
EL SAV. CiV. 1300, 1675; CosTA Ric. Civ. 1085; CuB. Civ. 1124, 1505;
Max. Civ. 1349, 1350, 2900 (new Civil Code 1949, 2300; of. 2310, 2312,
2313) ; BRAz. Civ. 1092, 1163. As has been stated above, the Argentinian
Civil Code does not admit rescission of sales contracts except in case of sales
for cash; even pacta commissoria in contracts of sale are forbidden. ARo.
Civ. 1408, 1410. The Commercial Code of Argentina, on the contrary, al-
ways presumes a rescissory clause in a bilateral contract. Alta. 216.
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the price. But if the property has been transferred by the buyer
to a bona fide purchaser, revindication will be denied and the
resolution will remain ineffective.
(3) and (4) Revindication for non-payment and privilege are
remedies known only to French law.-TM Under the name "revin-
dication for non-payment" Section 2102, 4 of the French Civil
Code gives the unpaid seller the right to repossess from the
buyer the property sold, provided this property still remains (a)
in its original condition, (b) in the possession of the buyer, and
provided that (c) revindication is exercised vithin eight days
after delivery. Theoretically this right stands in open contradic-
tion to the theory of sales adopted by the Code Napoldon, viz.,
that the sale is perfected and title passes as soon as the parties
have agreed upon the thing sold and the price.-- It was re-
tained in the Code as a survival of the old French law which
was based upon an entirely different theory of ancient Roman
law whereby the sale was not perfected until delivery and, in
the case of sale without credit, payment of the price. According
to this theory, if the price were not paid the seller who had not
granted credit could revindicate the thing sold as his property','
-hence the improper use of the term "revindication" in Section
2102, 4 of the French Civil Code. In the present system of
French law this remedy is not revindication at all in the proper
sense of the word, but is sinmply a peculiar action whereby the
78 FRiNCH CIm. 2102,4; Dom. Cxv. 2102,4; HArr. Civ. 1869; BOL. CIv. 1488.
T9 FRENCH Crv. 1583.
so "Qui vend aucune chose mobili~re shns jour and sans terme esperant
estre pay6 promptement il peut la chose poursuivre, en quelque lieu qu'elle
soit transport~e, pour estre pay6 du prix qu'il la vendue." COUTUIE DE-
PAIs, art. 176. A seventeenth century French writer, Julien Brodeau, in
his comments on this rule refers to early decisions holding that the unpaid
seller may revindicate the property from innocent purchasers (Prevost
de Paris, Nov. 9, 1604) even if it has been resold many times (Chambre de
Requites, July 24, 1587). 2 BRODEAU, COUSTUDxE DE PREVOsT Er VICOMT
DE PARIS (1669) 426.
SA "Traditionibus et usucapionibus non nudis pactis dominia transfer-
untur." COD. II., 3j 1. 20. "Venditae vera res et traditae non aliter emptori
adquiruntur quam si is pretium solverit vel alio modo ei satisfecerit . . .
sed si is qui vendidit fidem emptoris sequutus fuerit dicendum est statim
rem emptoris fieri." INST. JUST. II., I., § 41. The famous French text-
writer of the eighteenth century, Pothier, says that certain scholars had been
of the opinion that tradition of a thing, the price of which had not been
paid, carried a presumption that the seller "followed the faith of the
buyer" (fidern emptm-is secutu, fusrit), and that, therefore, title had passed,
but that this opinion had been well refuted by Fabianus de Mlonte as con-
tradicting the rule of Justinian. Pothier himself, however, thinks that the
rule of Justinian does not hold if the seller permits a considerable period
of time to elapse without demanding payment; in this case he must be
considered as having given credit to the buyer and passed title to him.
POTHIm, TRAra DU CONTRAT DE VENTE (1768) §§ 318, 324.
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unpaid seller may regain possession of the thing sold, so that
he can exercise his rights of retention and resolution .2 Privi-
lege, or lien for the unpaid price of the property sold, belongs
to one who sells either for cash or on credit, as long as the thing
sold remains in the buyer's possession.
Among Latin-American codes, only the Bolivian Civil Code has
adopted the French law of revindication and privilege; all others
restrict the remedies of the unpaid seller exclusively to retention
and resolution.
B. Remedies of the Unpaid Seller in Bankruptcy
The bankruptcy of the buyer intervening before the seller has
resorted to any of these remedies will, under certain circum-
stances, materially affect the rights of the unpaid seller. In this
connection the three following contingencies must be considered:
(1) the property may still be in the hands of the seller at the
time of the declaration of bankruptcy; (2) the property may
have been delivered to the bankrupt; (3) the property may have
been shipped by the seller but not yet physically delivered to the
buyer (en route or in transitu).
(1) If the property still remains in the hands of the unpaid
seller, all remedies which would have been available to him under
common or civil law before the bankruptcy of the buyer remain
intact, If he has sold for cash, he cannot be compelled to de-
liver the property until he has been paid, nor can he be deprived
of his right to rescind the sale for non-payment of the price."'
Likewise, if the sale was on credit, all codes, as has already been
explained, expressly grant the seller the right to retain the
property and subsequently rescind the sale, unless he has been
given sufficient security for payment.
(2) If the property has been actually delivered to the bank-
rupt, then, according to French law, the seller loses all his civil
law remedies. Section 550 of the Commercial Code expressly
takes away the right of retention and lien; likewise the French
courts have consistently held that the remedy of resolution cannot
survive bankruptcy and that the rights of an unpaid seller after
the buyer's bankruptcy are to be determined exclusively by the
Commercial Code, which does not grant this right to the seller.84
82 8 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. 'cit. smpra note 5, at § 832; THALLsn,
op. cit. supra note 5, at § 1943.
83 FRENCH 577; HAIT. 570; Domi. 577; 8 LYON-OAEN ET RENAULT, Op. Cit,
supra note 5, at § 858; THALLER, op. cit. sapyra note 5, at §§ 1956, 1957.
84 8 LYON-CAEX ET RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 834; see also de-
cision of Court of Appeal of Douai, July 30, 189G, DALLoz 1897, 2. 464,
ahd Court of Cassation (Civ.), Dec. 24, 1889, DALLoz 1890, 1. 161. The
Court of Douai very properly remarks that retolution is excluded in bank-
(Vol. 40
REVINDICATION IN BANKRUPTCY
In this respect, French law makes no distinction between sales
for cash and on credit; delivery is the only determining factor.
The seller thus retains only his claim for the price, protected by
no privilege and subject to pro rata satisfaction from the pro-
ceeds of the liquidation of the bankrupt's estate.
Latin-American codes are not unanimous on this question. A
few (Argentinian, Chilean, Ecuadorian, El Salvadorian, Nicara-
guan and Venezuelan), following the French system, deprive the
unpaid seller of all specific remedies when the merchandise has
been delivered. Others distinguish between sales for cash and
on credit terms and, under the influence of old French and
Roman law (which granted the unpaid seller for cash revindica-
tion of the property sold), authorize an unpaid seller for cash to
revindicate the property as long as it remains in a clearly recog-
nizable and identifiable condition, unmixed with other property
belonging to the bankrupt15 But all are unanimous in depriv-
ing the seller on credit of all civil law remedies after delivery
of the goods, thus reducing him to the status of an ordinary
general creditor. The mere passing of title, however, or even
constructive "tradition," will not amount to a delivery so as to
come within the rule; as will be seen later the property must be
physically delivered to the buyer or placed within his control.
The seller who has parted with possession may preserve his
civil law remedy if he undertakes to exercise it before the
declaration of bankruptcy. The property need not be actually
retaken, however, it sufficing if the seller merely commences the
action of resolution or revindication before the declaration of
bankruptcy. 0  The moment of filing the suit determines the
rights of the parties; the sale having been declared void by the
plaintiff as of the date of the commencement of the action, sub-
sequent events can no longer affect the remedy6s
(3) But if the property, although shipped by the seller, has
not been actually delivered, so that it is technically en route or
"in transitu" at the time of the declaration of bankruptcy, the
seller, while still losing his rights under the common or civil
law, is sufficiently protected by a special remedy of the com-
mercial laws of bankruptcy--called "revindication"--whereby he
ruptey cases because to admit resolution would mean to permit repw~es-
sion, i.e., revindication against the express sense of Article 550.
8: BOL. 654; COL. 1655; COSTA Ric. 31; GuAT. 1260, 12G1; HoND. 897,7;
PxRuv. 921,8; MIx. 999,9; CuB. 909,9; BEazm. 1385; cf. LozANo, op. cit.
supra note 66, at 414.8 6Court of Cassation (civ.), Dec. 24, 188%, Dalloz 1890, 1. 1G1.
87 THALLEI, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 1948; 8 LYoq-CQEN ur RENAULT, Op.
cit. supra note 5, at § 935; BOIsTEL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 770 ff. The
remedy may be defeated only by subsequent payment. See 2 P.ANbOL, op.
cit. supra note 38, at § 1319.
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may stay the delivery and reclaim the property." The exercise
of this remedy is dependent on certain conditions, viz.: (1) the
price of the property must not have been paid or the buyer's
obligation to pay otherwise discharged (novated, compensated,
cancelled, etc.) ; (2) the property must be identifiable-only a
corpus certum can be reclaimed; (3) the property must not have
been delivered to the buyer's warehouse, or other place under his
control agreed upon between the seller and the buyer; (4) the
property must not have been resold by the buyer to a third per-
son, in good faith, upon invoices and bills of lading signed by the
seller. The first two conditions seem so self-evident as to re-
quire no further comment. The last two deserve more detailed
consideration.
Delivery of the property will preclude revindication only if
it is an actual physical delivery to the warehouses (mayazins,
almacenes) of the bankrupt, or to similar places under his con-
trol where he conducts his business and where the property de-
livered will become a part of his assets visible to his creditors.
The passing of title, or tradition, if not accompanied by delivery,
will not destroy the seller's remedy. Thus, segregating and ex-
hibiting property to the buyer, delivering it to a carrier for ship-
ment, giving to the buyer the keys of the containers, allowing
the buyer to affix his marks to the property, even sending a
negotiable bill of lading to the buyer at the latter's risk and for
88 FRENCH 576; Doms. 576; HAiT. 570-573; ARG. LEI DE QUIEBRA 98 f1';
URUG. 1688, 1689; BOL. 654, 2; CoL. 165, 6; Ecu. 996, 3; CosTA Ric. 31, 6;
GUAT. 1263; Nic. 1110, 7; EL. SALV. 804, 6; HOND. 897, 8; VENEZ. 996, 3;
PEnuv. 921, 9; MEx. 999, 10; CUB. 909, 9; BRAZIL, 138, 4, 5, 6; cf. also
8 LYoN-CAEN I' RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 840; Court of Appeals
of Dijon, July 21, 1890, DALLOZ 1892, 2.1.
The term "revindication" applied to this remedy is, of course, quite incor-
rect. The remedy here belongs to a seller who has parted with title and has
only a personal claim for the price; therefore, strictly speaking, he can-
not revindicate. Actually the remedy is nothing else than a special case
of resolution (rescission), allowed because of the anticipated inability of
the bankrupt to pay.
The Brazilian law of bankruptcy is the most liberal of all codes in the
protection of a seller on credit in case of the buyer's bankruptcy. In addi-
tion to the usual revindication of merchandise not paid for in full, which has
not come into the actual possession of the bankrupt, this law permits the
seller to revindicate (a) merchandise sold fifteen days before the de-
mand for a preventive concordata or declaration of bankruptcy, even
though the merchandise has been delivered to the debtor, and (b) merchan-
dise sold within forty days prior to the preventive concordata if the seller
was induced to sell by fraud of the debtor.
89 Cf. Court of Appeals of Caen, July 13, 1892, DALLOZ 1893, 2.422. In
this decision the court held, among other things, that the delivery, in order
to eliminate revindication, must be made to a special place (local) where
the buyer may have the goods at his free disposal and be able to persuade
third parties that he is actually the owner.
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his account, will not preclude revindication.0  On the other
hand, the loading of merchandise on a ship belonging to or used
by the buyer, delivery to a public warehouse subject to the orders
of the buyer, delivery to places especially agreed upon for that
purpose between the parties (particularly in the case of bulky
goods)-in other words, any act of physical transfer of posses-
sion or control-will be considered equivalent to delivery of the
merchandise to the warehouses of the buyer. Delivery to the
agent of the buyer, provided he is authorized to sell merchandise
of the buyer, is viewed in a similar light.,' But unless it has
been customary for him to store merchandise and hold it for the
buyer, so that his warehouse can be considered the buyer's habit-
ual warehouse, delivery to a forwarding agent will not exclude
revindication. 2  Merchandise put into the hands of a carrier or
forwarding agent cannot be regarded as being in the physical
possession of the consignee and taken into consideration by his
creditors as a part of his assets. 3
To defeat revindication, the delivery of the property into the
bankrupt's actual possession must be effected before the declara-
tion of bankruptcy. If the goods do not reach the bankrupt's
warehouse until after such declaration the seller will not be de-
prived of his right"-' for the reason that, delivered at this late
date, the merchandise could have no tendency to increase the
assets and, therefore, the credit of the bankrupt.
The French code and, in its wake, several Latin-American
codes contain rather detailed provisions concerning conditions
under which the resale of merchandise en route will defeat re-
vindication by the unpaid seller 03: (1) the merchandise must be
resold or generally title thereto must be lawfully transferred to
O See above citations and also 8 LYON-CAEN LT RENAULT, op. cit. SIzpret
note 5, at § 845.
9' Only two codes contain express provisions in this respect, viz., the
Venezuelan (996, 3) and Ecuadorian (996, 3).
92 Court of Cassation (civ.), July 29, 1875, DALLOz 1876, 1. 113.
93 8 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. dzLpr note 5, at § 842.
94 8 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 848; BoIsTEL, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 773; cf. THALLER, op. cit. snpra note 5, at § 1940.
95 FRENCH 576; Dom. 576; HArT. 572; CHIn. 1514, Ecu. 996, 3; GUAT.
1260; VENEz. 996, 3; EnAzI,. 138, 4. See 8 LYoN-CAEN Er RENAULT, op. cit.
supra note 5, at § § 849, 850. Boistel, on the contrary, holds that Section
576 of the French Commercial Code refers to the regular endorsement of
negotiable bills of lading. In his opinion, the sense of this rule is that in
its absence the mere endorsement of a bill of lading, not accompanied by
actual tradition, would not be sufficient to prevent revindication. BOISTEL,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 774-775. This is a rather weak argument, especially
in view of the fact that the negotiable copy of bill of lading carries to the
holder in due course title to the merchandise and its endorsement by the
consignee to the ultimate purchaser irrevocably transfers title to the latter.
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a third party (by barter, datio in solutum, pledge etc.) ; 11 (2) the
transfer must be made in good faith; and (3) the merchandise
must be resold on an invoice and bill of lading signed by the
original seller.
The reason for the first tvo conditions is obvious; the last con-
dition, however, appears at the first glance somewhat incon-
gruous. It is not customary for the seller to sign invoices; usually
only bills bf lading are endorsed for delivery to the buyer upon
acceptance of drafts or payment. But is must be clearly under-
stood that this rule does not refer to the endorsement of the nego-
tiable copy of a bill of lading which carries with it title to the
merchandise. If such a bill of lading has been delivered to the
consignee and subsequently endorsed by him to a third party, the
original seller's revindication is irretrievably lost under any cir-
cumstances. The rule under consideration refers to the case
where the consignee has no negotiable bill of lading in his hands
and is in possession only of an ordinary non-negotiable duplicate
set of shipping documents. In such a situation, if copies of in-
voice and bill of lading have been signed by the seller he will lose
revindication if the merchandise en route has been purchased in
good faith by a third party on the strength of such signed docu-
ments. It is essential that both the invoice and bill of lading be
signed by the consignor and delivered to the consignee. It is es-
sential also that both these instruments be exhibited by the latter
to the buyer so that it will be clear that he is buying merchandise
on the strength of documents which carry the consignor's con-
sent to relinquish revindication in the event of resale, even
though the negotiable copy of the bill of lading has not yet been
delivered to the consignee.9 7 But the actual assignment of these
documents to the ultimate buyer is not required by law, nor can it
be considered as essential in any respect. The codes speak only
of resale on (3ur) signed copies of invoices and bills of lading.
The Brazilian law is especially clear in this respect, providing
that the sale should be made in view (en vista) of these docu-
ments.
This rule is obviously intended as a compromise which will
recognize the interests both of the original seller and the ulti-
mate buyer in case the middle-man consignee goes into bank-
ruptcy. In the present highly developed system of exchange and
distribution of goods a shipment may change hands several times
while it is still in transit. This turn-over serves a legitimate
Or Court of Cassation, July 29, 1875, DALLoz 1876, 1. 113. See also 8
LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. supro, note 5, at § 852; 'GUINAZO, op. ct.
supra note 5, at 271.
07 This condition becomes immaterial if the merchandise was shipped with
the seller's knowledge that it would be resold en route. Cf. Court of Ap-
peal of Caen, July 13, 1892, DAuoz 1893, 2. 422.
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purpose and the law must protect those who acquire such goods
in good faith. On the other hand, the law seeks also to protect
the seller. It does so by depriving him of revindication only if
he has signed the invoices and bills of lading-an unusual prac-
tice and therefore one which can fairly carry the presumption
that the seller in doing as he did well understood the conse-
quences. Theoretically, this limitation of the revindication of
the unpaid seller may seem broad and substantial. Practically,
however, its scope is considerably restricted, for it is not cus-
tomary to furnish the buyer on credit with signed copies of in-
voices and bills of lading. If the seller trusts the buyer and
wishes to confer upon him the power to dispose of the mer-
chandise before its arrival, he will simply send him an ordinary
negotiable copy of the bill of lading.
Somewhat different rules are found in the Argentinian and
Uruguayan codes. 9 Under the Argentinian law merchandise
that has not yet been received by the bankrupt buyer cannot be
revindicated if it has been resold to a third party in good faith
while the invoice or bill of lading (ocean or inland) was still
en route. Under Uruguayan law merchandise that has been re-
sold to a third party in good faith while still in transitu on
invoice or bill of lading is not revindicable. These read as much
broader rules indeed than the provisions of the French code.
They are supplemented in both codes, however, by an exception
which reduces them to quite inoffensive limits, viz., if the par-
ties agree that the risk for the merchandise shaU remain with the
seller until delivery, then the subsequent sale before delivery
does not affect revindication. By this means a seller who prefers
to retain the right of revindication may fully protect himself
against any contingency. Of course, he will obtain the protec-
tion at the cost of carrying the risk of loss of the merchandise
while it is in transitu. But the availability of marine insur-
ance, together with the fact that Latin-American buyers usually
pay but scant attention to the provisions of law governing the
passing of title to merchandise and generally refuse to pay for
shipments lost or damaged in transitu unless they themselves
receive compensation from the insurance company, would seem
to render this price not altogether out of proportion to the ad-
vantages gained.
Other Latin-American codes contain no rules concerning the
resale of merchandise in transitu. In those jurisdictions, in
view of the very precise law authorizing the unpaid seller to
revindicate the merchandise until it has been delivered to the
original buyer, the purchaser of merchandise in transitu would
be unable to oppose the revindication and would have to go for
the price paid to the "conwurso" as a simple general creditor.
s .ARG. LEi DE QU msRA 104, 106; URUG. 1720, 1722.
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C. Performance of Sales Contract by Syndics
The right of revindication belongs to the unpaid seller not be-
cause of the mere fact of the buyer's bankruptcy, but because the
bankruptcy creates a reasonable presumption of his inability to
perform his obligation under the sales contract; in other words,
it may be considered as a presumptive anticipatory breach of
the contract. But this presumption is not incontrovertible and
bankruptcy in itself does not invalidate the sales contract as a
matter of law. On the contrary, the creditors of the bankrupt
assembled in the "concurso" and represented (as masa or estate)
by the syndic, curator, liquidator, etc., may demand from the
seller the performance of the sales contract, provided they them-
selves are willing to perform the bankrupt buyer's obligation
under the contract. In the case of a sale for cash, this requires
a payment of the price at once; if the sale is on credit, full pay-
ment at maturity must be guaranteed by a bond or otherwise.
The seller then has no right to revindicate the merchandise.,"
Moreover, as explained above, if the goods are still unshipped
he will also lose the right of retention and will be obligated to
perform the sales contract as though the bankruptcy had not
occurred.
By affirming an unexecuted contract and paying or guaran-
teeing the payment of the price in full, the syndic of the estate
in fact incurs a new obligation binding upon the estate and novat-
ing the old contract under which the estate was responsible only
pro rata. As authority to obligate the estate is not ordinarily
within the power of a syndic, whose functions are limited simply
to preserving and liquidating the bankrupt's assets, the decision
to demand from the seller the performance of the contract of
sale against full payment must be approved by the court. A few
codes contain express provisions to this effect; 11,O in others the
rule is derived from the general provisions of the law governing
the rights and duties of syndics.
V. REVINDICATION OF THE PRICE OF RECLAIMABLE PROPERTY SOLD
BY THE BANKRUPT
A. Property Held in Bailment
We have already seen that property held by the bankrupt in
bailment can be revindicated by the owner from the bankrupt's
estate insofar as it remains there physically and is in a recogniz-
99 FRENCH 578; DoIm. 578; HAIT. 576; ARO. LEx DE QUIEBRA 108; URUG.
1724; BoL. 654; Criu. 1519; CoL. 165; EL SALV. 998; COSTA RIC. 31, 6;
GUAT. 1266; Nic. 1110, 7; VENEZ. 997; HOND. 897; EL SAV. 804; PEnuv.
921; MEx. 998; CUB. 908, 909.
1° VENEZ. 999; COSTA Ric. 31, 6; Nic. 1109; EL SAV. 801; ECU. 998.
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able condition. But what are remedies of the ownei: if it ap-
pears that the property has been sold by the bankrupt? Here
various contingencies must be considered; first of all, the ques-
tion arises whether the buyer has or has not paid the price to
the bankrupt.
(1) If the price has been paid in cash, then on the strength
of the principle that revindication will lie only for specific non-
fungible property (corpus certum), the owner will generally
have no remedy except a claim for a dividend as a general credi-
tor. This rule, however, is not absolute. As has already ap-
peared, in jurisdictions where funds are revindicable money paid
by the buyer to the bankrupt will be subject to revindication (or
rather to a preferential claim), provided it has been understood
between the owner and the bankrupt that the latter would have
no right to charge the price to the current account or use it
generally, but would hold it in trust for the owner.'0 ' Of course,
this test will be required only in regard to the price paid for
property cansigned to the bankrupt for sale. If the bankrupt
has unlawfully sold property simply dcposited with him without
authority to sell in other words, converted it, its price will be al-
ways revindicable, in jurisdictions where funds are revindicable,
because the sale was illicit and the price could not be subject to
compensation between the owner and the bankrupt. Further-
more, if the price of merchandise sold by the bankrupt bailee has
been paid after the declaration of bankruptcy, the owner will
have the right to claim this price in preference to other creditors
under any circumstances. This follows from the theory that
after the declaration of bankruptcy the bankrupt can no longer
lawfully collect money from the buyer for the principal's ac-
count; so if the price is collected by the syndic, the latter cannot
receive it for the estate, but only as a de facto agent (vzgotiorum
gestor) of the owner. 0 2
(2) When the price of the property sold has not been paid
there are again two possibilities to consider. The buyer may
simply owe the price on open account, or he may have delivered
negotiable paper to the bankrupt, which still remains among the
latter's assets.
In the former case French and Latin-American codes ex-
pressly give the owner of the merchandise the right to recover
from the buyer the price, or any portion of it remaining unpaid,
provided, however, the buyer's obligation has not been "com-
pensated" (set-off) by entering it as a debit item in his current
account with the bankrupt."03 The issue is clear if, after debiting
o Supra note 69.
102o BOIsTEL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 769 innflue; 8 LYO,-CAEN ET RENAULT,
op. cit. supra note 5, at § 800; GuiNAzfl, op. cit- supra note 5, at 279.
13 ARG. LEI DE QUIBRA 109; URUG. 1726; BOL. 655; COL. 165, 4; Ecu.
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the price, the current account still shows a balance in favor of the
buyer. In this case, the latter owes nothing to the bankrupt's
estate, and is obviously as immune from any claims of the owner
as from claims of the general creditors. But the question is less
clear if the balance is against the buyer. May the original owner
then revindicate the balance to the extent that it does not exceed
the value of the merchandise?
This question has been discussed in detail by the French text
writers. Section 575 of the French Code authorizes revindication
only if the price has not bein compensated through the current
account between the bankrupt and the buyer.1 4 In commenting
upon this section, the greatest of all French authorities on com-
mercial law, Lyon-Caen,105 gives the owner the right of revindi-
cation if the current account consists of only one entry-the
price of the merchandise-without any entries to the buyer's
credit, on the theory that in such a case there could be no "com-
pensation through the current account." If there are entries to
the buyer's credit, then, in Lyon-Caen's opinion, there will be
compensation (full or partial) through the current, account;
the case being outside of Section 575, there is nothing to elim-
inate the novating effect of the current account and revindica-
tion will not lie for the price, even though the buyer still owes a
sum equivalent to the whole or part of the price. The balance
will be recoverable by the estate, but the owner will participate
in it only pro rata as a general creditor. Boistel and, among
the latest writers, Thaller, on the other hand, are inclined to
admit revindication, regardless of whether or not there are en-
tries in the current account to the buyer's credit, provided the
balance is in favor of the bankrupt.1 6
Lyon-Caen's opinion is undoubtedly correct from the view.
point of the French theory of current account (novatory effect,
indivisibility of the balance after the entry has been made) ; but
it seems to stand in contradiction to the wording of Section 575
of the Commercial Code, which expressly states that the price
of merchandise and any portion thereof may be revindicated if
it has not been paid, settled in negotiable paper, or compensated
996, 2; CrnL. 1510; GUAT. 1259, 3; Nic. 1110, 5; VENEZ. 996, 2; HOND, 896,
6; EL SALv. 804, 6; GUAT. 1259, 3; PERUV. 821, 7; MEX. 998, 8; CuB. 908, 8;
FRENCH 575; Dom. 575; HArt. 575. Brazilian law further facilitates re-
vindication of the price, excluding it only when the price has been entered in
the current account upon consent of the owner. BRAZIL, 138, 2.
-104 "Pourra mme atre revendiqu6 le prix ou la partie do prix des dites
marchandises qui n'aura t6 ni pay ni regl6 en valeur, -ni compenw, cn compto
courant entre le failli et l'ach6teur." FRENCH 575.
105 8 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 802.




through the current acount.0 7 Under the rules of grammatical
interpretation the words "or any portion thereof" apply to all
of the three contingencies mentioned in the subsequent part
the owner of the property to revindicate negotiable paper re-
of the section. There seems to be no reason whatever to read
the section in such a way as to apply these qualifying words only
to payment or settlement in paper and deny revindication of that
portion of price which remains uncompensated on the account.
(3) There is less unanimity in the codes as to the right of
the owner of the property to revindicate negotiable paper, re-
ceived in payment from the buyer and still in the bankrupt's es-
tate. The letter of the French Commercial Code seems to ex-
clude revindication altogether if the merchandise has been paid
for by the buyer in negotiable paper (regl6 en cvalew9).l This
rule is rather liberally construed by the French courts, however,
to mean that revindication is not permissible if the buyer settled
by endorsing negotiable paper made by a third party to his or
another's order. But if the buyer himself signs a promissory
note or accepts a draft payable to the banlaupt such paper may
be revindicated by the owner of the merchandise, inasmuch as it
is not considered a settlement in paper.10'
Among Latin-American laws, the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan
codes contain an exceedingly harsh rule permitting the revindica-
tion of negotiable paper given in payment of price only if the
paper is made or endorsed to the order of the owner himself.""
In other words, in these jurisdictions, if the price is paid in paper
made or endorsed to the order of the bankrupt, or to bearer, the
owner will have no right to revindicate it, even though it still
remains among the bankrupt's assets and its origin and destina-
tion can be clearly proven. Other more liberal codes expressly
admit the revindication of negotiable paper given in payment
for property sold by the bankrupt, regardless of whether it has
been made or endorsed by the buyer, or whether it has been
made or endorsed to the order of the owner or the bankrupt-
provided it still remains in the estate and has not been com-
pensated through the current account between the owner and
the banh-upt.l1 As Lozano says in his annotations to the DMexi-
107 Supra note 104.
os French 575.
309 Court of Cassation (req.) Feb. 27, 1908, DALLoz 1909, 1. 51. See
8 LyoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5 at § 801. Contra: TnALL.%
op. cit. supra note 5, at § 1133.
uO Ecu. 996,2; VENEZ. 996, 2.
I'l AmG. LEi DE QUIEBRA 103; URUG. 1719; BOL. 655; CoL. 165, 4; CHnL.
1510; GUAT. 1259, 3; Nic. 110, 6; HoND. 897, 6; Er SALV. 804, 6; Pnu .
921, 7; BRAzIm 138, 2; MIEx. 999, 8; CUB. 909, 8. In this group must be
included the Haitian Commercial Code which, following the old French rule,
omits reference to the "reglenent s nvaicars" existing in the present French
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can Commercial Code, "drafts and notes that are in the posses-
sion of the bankrupt as payment for sales made for account of
another person . . . are not a completed payment (paga ya
realizada) but a promise to pay, which must be considered as an
amount due (cantidad debida)." m
(4) Within the limits allowed in individual codes, the right
to revindicate the price of property sold by a commission agent
will belong to the principal-owner, regardless of whether or not
the commission agent when selling the merchandise disclosed
the principal. In this connection the right of revindication ap-
pears as a rather important exception to the general rule of
French and Latin-America 1 codes concerning the status of an
undisclosed principal.
Unlike Anglo-American law these codes do not consider the
actual principal as a party to the transaction made on his behalf
by an agent if the latter did not disclose the principal's identity.
All remedies of an undisclosed principal are against the agent,
and he has no right to demand performance directly from the
other party to the contract, nor can the other party have any
direct claim against the undisclosed principal. In such trans-
actions the agent appears as the actual party to the entire ex-
clusion of the undisclosed principal.1 3
The rigidity of this rule is considerably, though onesidedly,
mitigated, however, in case the agent goes into bankruptcy be-
fore the sales contract has been fully performed. Bankruptcy
will not influence the rights of the buyer who still will have no
recourse except against the agent and, therefore, will have to file
his claim in bankruptcy as a general creditor; but the seller-
principal, as the owner of the property sold, will have the right
to revindicate its price, in accordance with the above explained
rules, even though his name was not disclosed at the time when
the sale was made by the agent. 14
B. If Property Was Sold in Transitu by Bankrupt Buyer
We have already seen that, in many jurisdictions, if the merchan-
dise has been sold to an innocent purchaser on signed invoices and
bills of lading and the price paid to the bankrult before
Code and, therefore, excludes revindication only if the price was paid or
compensated through a current account between the bankrupt and the
buyer, and a contrario permits it if the price has been paid in negotiable
paper.
1122 LOZANO, op. cit. supra note 66, at 414.
L13 FPENCH 94. Cf. DALLOZ, DIaTIONAIRE PRATIQUE DU DRO1T (12th ed.)
Vol. I, p. 245, No. 9, 16; HAIT. 91; COL. 360; ECU. 365; HOND. 159; CuIIL,
257; PERUV. 239; ARG. 233; BRAZIL. 166; COsTA Ric. 66; GUAT. 64; Nic.,
409; EL SAV. 157; MEX. 284; CuB. 246.
114 See supra note 103; ARG. 110; URUG. 1727.
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bankruptcy, the original seller will have no recourse except
against the estate as a general creditor. But if the price has not
been paid before the consignee's bankruptcy, will not the unpaid
seller have the right to revindicate the price from the ultimate
buyer?
Only the codes of Chile and Argentina 215 expressly confer this
right upon the seller. All other Latin-American codes,11 r as
well as the French code, are silent upon the question. In the
absence of special provisions, however, there is no reason to
deny this right to the seller. The law expressly gives him the
right to repossess merchandise until it has been delivered to the
consignee. If the consignee sells the merchandise before de-
livery and the price remains unpaid, there has been substituted
for the merchandise a claim for the price which cannot be phy-
sically or symbolically commingled with other assets of the bank-
rupt, but which, on the contrary, preserves its identity until
payment. In other words, although not physical property, it
has all the requisites of a "corpiTs certum' and, therefore can
be revindicated. Likewise, by analogy with the revindication of
the price of the merchandise consigned and deposited, the seller
has the right to revindicate the price of the merchandise from
the buyer.- "
If the buyer of the goods in transitu at the time of the declara-
tion of bankruptcy has paid the estate after such declaration,
what will be the remedy of the original unpaid seller? This is a
much disputed question upon which there is very little authority.
A decision of the Commercial Tribunal of Buenos Aires in 1911,
quoted by Mfalagarriga in his Codigo de Cornercio Annotado.,U
upholds the right of the seller to claim the price in preference to
other creditors. The decision rests on the theory that the right
of revindication is fixed at the date of the declaration of bank-
ruptcy and that further acts of the syndic (resale and collection
of the price) are of no effect, the intention of the law being not
to allow the estate to be enriched by assets which could not have
influenced the dealings of third parties with the bankrupt. Less
than six years later, however, the Commercial Tribunal reversed
itself on this point- and in a very detailed opinion denied the
right of the seller to revindicate or to claim any preference for
the amount paid into the estate for merchandise resold by the
- CHIL. 1514; ARG. 1482.
:,16 This refers, of course, only to the codes which deny physical revindica-
tion in the case of the resale of merchandise in transitu. See supra note 95.
117 Cf. 8 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 851 bis.
"Is 9 MALAGARRIG., op. cit. supra note 10, at 366; Font Valles v. Con-
curso de Urizar y Casanuova, Juris. Trib. Cam. Com. (April 1911) 233-234.
1199 ALAGARRIGA, op. cit. supra note 10, at 366-368; Sum Frres c.
Grenovich Hnos, in concurso, Decision of Cam. Com. Nov. 30, 1916.
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syndic after the declaration of bankruptcy. This decision was
based on the rule that three conditions must be coincident in
order to give the seller the right of revindication, viz., (1) non-
payment of the price to the seller, (2) non-delivery of the mer-
chandise into the possession of the debtor before bankruptcy,
(3) recognizable status of the property (que la cosa 'pueda ser in-
dividualizada) .120 If the first two conditions are present but the
third is not, the revindication will not lie. Thus in the case
under consideration the court held that when the syndic took the
merchandise out of the custom house and sold it with other mer-
chandise before the seller had filed his demand for revindication,
the third condition was not fulfilled and revindication was im-
possible. The court raised the question whether the seller, in-
stead of revindicating, could simply claim the price of the prop-
erty as indemnity. This was decided in the negative on the
theory that the syndic sold the merchandise in the fulfillment of
his duties without violating any rights of the seller.
At first glance, it would seem that, if by analogy to the re-
covery of the unpaid price of merchandise deposited or con-
signed the unpaid seller may have a preferential claim for the
unpaid price of merchandise resold by the bankrupt buyer in
transitu, then by the same analogy the seller must have a similar
claim to the price of the merchandise resold if the price is paid
into the estate cfter the declaration of bankruptcy. A more de-
tailed analysis of the question, however, leads to the conclusion
that the analogy does not extend so far. If merchandise, which
was not delivered to the buyer before his bankruptcy, was either
sold by the bankrupt on bills of lading and invoices while in
transitu, or subsequently taken out and sold by the syndic, and
the price paid into the estate after the declaration of bankruptcy
but prior to the demand for revindication by the unpaid seller,
then the latter could not claim either the merchandise or its price
but would have to make his claim as a general creditor.
In this regard it must be kept in mind that the intervention of
the buyer's bankruptcy while the merchandise is still en route
does not of itself vitiate the sale as a matter of law, but simply
gives the seller the right to stop the delivery, reclaim the mer-
chandise and retain it until either the syndic performs the con-
tract or he, the seller, rescinds the sale for non-performance.
This is a discretionary right which the seller may or may not
use, and as long as he does not exercise it the sale remains in
full force and the merchandise can be lawfully sold by the syndic,
subject, of course, to the right of the seller to revindicate it
while it remains in the estate in an identifiable condition.
If the merchandise is resold by the buyer or the syndic and
120 Cf. ARG. LEI de QUEBRA 99.
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the price not yet paid by the ultimate purchaser, revindication
against the merchandise is lost, but the seller will have an own-
er's claim for the unpaid price, which, as a chose in action, is a
clearly distinguishable asset (corpus certim) that has been sub-
stituted for the merchandise sold. But when the price has been
paid into the estate the transaction has been fully completed and
there is nothing at that time in the estate which can be identified
as the merchandise or its specific substitute. Therefore neither
the merchandise nor its price can be claimed by the unpaid
seller, any more' than an owner may claim property consigned
to an agent after it has been in some way transformed beyond
recognition (as grain mixed with grain from other sources and
ground into flour).
It is true that in the case of consignment the price of mer-
chandise sold by the bankrupt, if paid by the buyer into the estate
after the declaration of bankruptcy, is reclaimable. But no
analogy can be drawn between the case of sale by a commission
agent and sale by a buyer on credit terms. A commission agent
is supposed to sell for the account of the principal, and in the
case of the agent's bankruptcy it is reasonable and equitable to
hold that the syndic cannot collect the price of the consigned
merchandise otherwise than as the agent of the owner. The
price which was paid to the syndic thus becomes a debt of the
estate, not of the bankrupt, to the principal. But in the Argen-
tinian case under consideration the court had before it a bank-
rupt buyer who had acquired merchandise on credit terms under
a contract that was not invalidated by the bankruptcy but still
remained in force, simply subject to discretionary cancellation by
the seller. As long as this contract was not cancelled, the bank-
rupt before the declaration of bankruptcy, and the syndic after it,
had the right lawfully to sell the merchandise. If it was so sold
and the price paid into the estate, it was lawfully received by
the syndic, not on behalf of the unpaid seller but on behalf of the
estate. Consequently, after the price had been paid and com-
mingled with other funds the seller lost his preferential remedy
and became an ordinary general creditor.
VI. PARTICULAR CASES OF REVINDICATION
In addition to the normal or regular forms of revindication thus
far considered there may be found in some of the Latin-American
codes special rules concerning various particular cases of re-
vindication. Upon closer consideration, however, these instances
of revindication, appear, in fact, nothing more than preferential
rights of certain creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. Their in-
clusion in chapters of codes dealing with revindication is prob-
ably due to the fact that no better place could be found for hem.
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(1) As a protection to the holders of banknotes, a few codes 1 1
specifically provide that in the case of insolvency of an emitting
bank, the total amount (importo) of banknotes issued by it is
subject to revindication. This is obviously not a case of revin-
dication in the proper sense of the term, but simply the granting
of a preferential claim to the holders of banknotes as a matter
of public policy, just as in this country bonds deposited by a
national bank with the Treasurer of the 'United States preferen-
tially protect holders of banknotes to the full extent of their
face value.
(2) Several codes 122 specifically provide that in the case of
the pledgor's bankruptcy the pledgee may exercise revindica-
tion in regard to property in his possession, subject to the right
of the creditors to redeem the property pledged and, if it is sold,
subject to the obligation of the pledgee to surrender to the estate
the surplus proceeds after full satisfaction of the debt. This
right of the pledgee, of course, is not a case of revindication. A
pledgee has nothing to revindicate; he simply retains the prop-
erty pledged. The provision in the bankruptcy laws seems en-
tirely superfluous, since in the case of bankruptcy the respective
interests of the pledgor, the pledgee, and the pledgor's creditors
are fully protected by the general provisions of civil codes gov-
erning pledges. For that reason most codes make no special men-
tion of a pledgee's "revindication."
(3) The Commercial Codes of Chile and Guatemala provide
that a commission agent who has bought merchandise for his
principal and paid for it out of his own funds may use the same
remedies against the principal that the latter could use in the
case of the agent's bankruptcy. 23 Again this remedy is not re-
vindication but rather a logical attribute of the lien on mer-
chandise which commission agents in practically all jurisdic-
tions are allowed for disbursements made by them in behalf
of the principal..12 4
VII. PROCEDURE-ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REVINDICANT
AND ESTATE
The revindicant is not permitted simply to take possession of
his property without due process. The bankrupt estate in its en-
tirety is affected with the rights of all creditors and nothing
121 MEX. 999, 12; CUB. 910; Nic. 1110, 9; HOND. 898.
122 MEX. 999, 11; CUB. 909, 11; Nic. 1110, 8.
123 CmIL. 1516; GUAT. 1264, 1265.
124 FRENCH 95; Dom. 95; HAT. 92; COL. 388; Ecu. 382, 383; BOL. 143;
VENEZ. 398; CHIL. 184, 300; PERUV. 270; ARa. 279; URUG. 384; BRAZIL. 189;




can be withdrawn from the assets which composed the estate on
the date of the declaration of bankruptcy, except by consent of
the creditors, or, if the claim is contested, upon final adjudica-
tion by the court. Although this rule seems too self-evident to
require statutory confirmation, several codes contain special pro-
visions to this effect.125
Prior to actual repossession, the revindicant must reimburse
the estate for all expenses which the bankrupt may have in-
curred in connection with the property reclaimed, as well as
refund all advances received from the bankrupt on account
of it.126 In regard to the property held by the bankrupt in bail-
ment, this is no more than the application to the special case
of bankruptcy of a general law common to all jurisdictions which
grants to commission agents and depositees a lien for expenses
and disbursements incurred in connection with the property con-
signed.7-2 7 As to property revindicated by the unpaid seller, his
obligation to refund the advances and expenses is also merely
the necessary legal effect of the "in integrum restitutionis," which
takes place actually when the property, the price of which has
not been paid before the bankruptcy, is taken back by the revin-
dicating seller.
The rights of the repossessing unpaid seller suffer very ma-
terially from the buyer's bankruptcy. Ordinarily an unpaid sell-
er who uses his right of resolution (rescission) for non-payment
of the price has, under all civil codes, the right to claim dam-
ages from the defaulting buyer for breach of the contract (chiefly
the difference between the contract and the resale price), Theo-
retically, there would seem to be no reason why the unpaid
seller should not have the same right against a bankrupt buyer.
But, although only three codes 1 contain express rules on this
question, the provisions of all commercial codes 125 concerning the
revindication of goods in transitu are so worded as to exclude
any doubt that the seller has no right to claim damages from
the bankrupt estate. As has been repeatedly stated above, the
FRENCH 578; DoM. 578; HAiT. 579; VENEZ. 999; CHIL. 1512; PEnuv.
920; COSTA Ric. 30; Nic. 1109; HOND. 896; EL SALv. 803; GUAT. 1258.
126 FRENCH 576; DoM. 576; HArt. 573; ARG. LEI DE QuiEBLL 102; URuG.
1716; 1718; CHIL. 1515; Ecu. 996, 3; Nic. 1109; VENEz. 996, 3; GUAT. 1262;
HOND. 896; EL SALV. 803; PERuv. 920; BRAZm. 143, 1.
=7 FRENCH 95, Civ. 1948; Dom. 95, Civ. 1948; HArr. 92, Civ. 1714, 1715;
COL. 388, Crv. 2258, 2259; Ecu. 382, Civ. 2221, 2222; BOL. 143, Civ. 1305,
1306; VENEz. 398, Civ. 1848, 1849; CHiL. 184, 300, Civ. 2234, 2235, 1576;
Pn RUv. 270, Civ. 1856; ARG. 279, Civ. 2252, 2258; BRAZIL. 183, CiM. 1279;
COSTA Ric. 116, Crv. 1357; GUAT. 111; Nic. 432, 3487; Ho,%D. 189-191, Civ.
1961, 1932; PAN. Civ. 1472, 1473; EL SALV. 136, Civ. 1991, 1992; MEx. 305,
CirV. 2585, 2586, (new) 2532, 2533; CUB. 276, Civ. 1779, 1780.
328 AR. 1480; PERuV. 1718; FRENCH 576, since March 20, 1928.
:29 Except the FRENCH, since 1928, supra note 126.
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intervening bankruptcy defeats the seller's right under the civil
codes to rescind the sale; his right to revindicate goods in tran-
situ is a special remedy given him by special laws, the commer-
cial codes. Therefore, the scope of this right is to be deter-
mined exclusively on the basis of these special laws. The com-
mercial codes expressly provide that the seller must refund all
advances paid and expenses sustained by the bankrupt buyer
but do not contain provisions conferring upon the seller the
concomitant right to make a counterclaim for damages-clauses
which would have been necessary had the law intended to give
this right to the seller. Consequently, there appears only one
correct construction of the statutes in that respect, namely, that
the special remedy of resolution, which is in fact the revindica-
tion of merchandise in transitu, does not carry with it the right
to claim damages inherent in this remedy in common civil law.
This theory was forcibly expressed, until very recently, in lead-
ing decisions of the French courts, 13 0 and seems to be well set-
tled at present in all Latin-American courts.
There has been no such unanimity, however, among the writ-
ers. Such eminent authorities as Lyon-Caen and Renault wholly
disagree with the interpretation of the earlier French decisions
and emphatically insist that the unpaid seller must be entitled, in
addition to revindication, to claim damages in case of the buyer's
bankruptcy. This conclusion is based on the theory that, as a
general rule of civil law cannot be repudiated by implication
merely because it has not been reproduced in the commercial
code, a 9pecial statute would be required to deny this right to the
seller; that if the syndic has the right to profit from the unper-
formed sale, demanding performance in case the price of the
merchandise goes up, the seller must also have the right to pro-
tect himself against loss if the price goes down; and especially
that if the buyer can claim damages from the bankrupt seller
it is only natural that the seller must also have the right to claim
damages from the bankrupt buyer.13' Another well-known
writer, Thaller, is of the opinion that damages can be claimed
when the seller has not yet parted with the possession of goods
but that the theory of the courts is correct as to merchandise in
transitu.1 32
130 Court of Cassation (civ.). Feb. 16, 1887, DALLOZ 1887, 1. 201; Court
of Cassation (req.) Apr. 8, 1895, DALLOZ 1895, 1. 481 (Held that the buyer
has no right to claim damages even if local usage gives him that right);
Chambre des Requetes, April 24, 1903, DALLoz 1904, 1. 229.
131'8 LYON-CAEN Er RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § § 861, 862; of.
Court of Appeal of Paris, March 9, 1904, quoted in 59 PANDECT.S F =4-
QAISES 9, No. 56, and confirmed by the Court of Cassation, June 15, 1900,
DALLOZ 1901, 1. 25.
132 THALLER, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 1957.
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The arguments advanced by Lyon-Caen and Renault seem
very convincing, but only insofar as they may be considered a
very good plea for enacting a new statute which will authorize
the seller to claim damages. As to the law as it was written in
the French code before 1928 and as it is still written in all other
c6des, these arguments hardly can defeat the strict logic of the
French decisions of that time, which were based on the express
words of the statute and the universally adopted rules of inter-
pretation.
These decisions of the French courts, however, are no longer
in force. Yielding to the arguments of text-riters and to the
well justified demands of commercial and financial interests, a
statute was recently passed in France 23: which entirely reversed
the law developed in these decisions. Section 526 of the Com-
mercial Code was supplemented by a provision giving the seller
the right, as against his duty, to restore whatever he may have
received on account of the transaction, to claim damages for
breach of contract if the syndic does not exercise his privilege of
adopting the contract and paying the price. Considering the
far-reaching influence that French law and jurisprudence has
always exercised over all Latin-American countries, it is rather
probable that similar statutes will be enacted in those countries;
or, even in the absence of express statutory provision, the local
courts may try to introduce the same rule by judicial inter-
pretation.
133 March 20, 1928.
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